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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of • ' l ' 
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, LOCAL 
1440, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. TIA2010-034 
STATEN ISLAND RAPID TRANSIT , 
OPERATING AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
COHEN, WEISS & SIMON, LLP (JOSHUA J. ELLISON, ESQ., 
of counsel), for Petitioner , 
PROSKAUER ROSE, LLP (NEIL H. ABRAMSON, ESQ., of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to usJrom a report and recommendation of the Director of 
Conciliation (Director), dated January 19, 2011 regarding a petition for interest ; 
arbitration filed by the United Transportation Union, Local 1440 (UTU) under §209.5 of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and §205.15 of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) with respect to an impasse in contract negotiations between UTU 
and the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority (SIRTOA). 
In his report and recommendation, the Director concludes that a voluntary 
resolution of the contract negotiations between UTU and SIRTOA cannot be effected 
and recommends that the impasse be referred to a public interest arbitration panel. 
SIRTOA has not filed an objection to the Director's report and recommendation, 
pursuant to §205.15(b) of the Rules. 
Following our review of the Director's report and recommendation, we hereby 
certify that a voluntary resolution of the contract negotiations between UTU and 
SIRTOA cannot be effected and we, therefore, refer the impasse involving these parties 
to a public interest arbitration panel. 
SO ORDERED.. 
DATED: February 14, 2011 
Albany, New York 
A 
• * / " / ' 
• / / Jerome Lefkowj^z, Chairman 
' • • ' • ' ' t / • . . 
9 (2. 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
o I M I c u r INCVV Tur\rv 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNCIL OF SCHOOL SUPERVISORS AND 
ADMINISTRATORS, LOCAL 1, AFSA, 
CASE NO. C-5672 
Petitioner, 
-and- . 
BROOKLYN EXCELSIOR CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Employer. 
In the.Matter of . , 
BROOKLYN EXCELSIOR CHARTER SCHOOL 
AND NATIONAL HERITAGE ACADEMIES, INC., 
CASE NO. E-2429 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO UNITED CHARTER SCHOOL EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
CASE NO. C-5878 
Petitioner, 
-and-
BUFFALO UNITED CHARTER SCHOOL, 
• Employer. 
HISCOCK & BARCLAY, LLP (LAURENCE B. OPPENHEIMER, SCOTT M. 
PECHAITIS AND NICHOLAS J. Dl CESARE of counsel), for BROOKLYN 
EXCELSIOR CHARTER SCHOOL, BUFFALO UNITED CHARTER SCHOOL, 
AND NATIONAL HERITAGE ACADEMIES, INC., Case Nos. C-5672, E-2429 
and C-5878 
BRUCE K. BRYANT, GENERAL COUNSEL, for COUNCIL OF SCHOOL 
SUPERVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, LOCAL 1, AFSA, Case Nos. C-
5672 and E-2429-
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE (ROBERT T. REILLY of counsel) for BUFFALO 
UNITED CHARTER SCHOOL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-
CIO NEW YORK, Case No. C-5878 
oase IMUS. u-oo/ii,. c-z^^a & 0-00/o 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE (JENNIFER N. COFFEY of counsel) AND ADAM 
S. ROSS, SPECIAL COUNSEL, for amici curiae NEW YORK STATE UNITED 
TEACHERS and UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, AFT, AFL-
. CIO, Case Nos. C-5672 and E-2429 
BRISCOE R. SMITH, for amicus curiae ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, 
Case Nos. E-2429 and C-5878 
DAVID J. STROM. AND SAMUEL J. LIEBERMAN, for amicus curiae 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Case No. C-5878 
DAVID BRODSKY (RUSSELL J. PLATZEK AND MAURICE MILLER, of 
counsel AND LAUREN WAMBOLD AND STEFANIE COYLE student 
attorneys) for amicus curiae NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION, Case Nos. C-5672, E-2429 and C-5878 
PHILIP A. HOSTAK, for amicus curiae NATIONAL EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION, Case Nos. C-5672, E-2429 and C-5868 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on exceptions that raise the same jurisdictional 
issues: whether the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) is applicable to 
certain charter schools created and managed in conjunction with a for-profit business 
pursuant to the New York Charter Schools Act of 1998;1 and whether we are preempted 
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) from hearing and determining questions, of 
representation involving such charter schools. We have consolidated these cases for 
the purposes of oral argument and decision due to the significance of these shared 
legal issues. ' 
In Case C-5672, the Brooklyn Excelsior Charter School (Brooklyn Excelsior) and 
National Heritage Academies, Inc. (NHA) except to a decision by an Administrative Law 
\Educ Law §2850, et seq. 
2
 29 USC §151, etseq. 
uase INOS. 0-00/z, t-z^zy & 0-00/0 -o-
Judge (ALJ),3 on a petition filed by the Council of School Supervisors and 
Administrators, Local 1,-AFSA, AFL-CIO (Council) seeking to be certified as the 
representative of a unit of assistant principals working at Brooklyn Excelsior. In Case 
E-2429, Brooklyn Excelsior, NHA and the Council have filed exceptions to the same 
ALJ decision on an application by Brooklyn Excelsior and NHA seeking to designate the 
at-issue assistant principals at Brooklyn Excelsior as managerial and/or confidential 
under the Act. 
• In Case C-5878,-the Buffalo United Charter School Education Association, 
NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO (Association) has filed exceptions to a decision by a second 
ALJ4 on a petition by the Association seeking to be certified as the representative of a 
unit of instructional employees working at the Buffalo United Charter School (Buffalo 
United). 
AMICI CURIAE BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT 
In Cases C-5672 and E-2429, we granted a motion by the United Federation of 
Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) and the New York State United Teachers, AFT, 
NEA, AFL-CIO (NYSUT) for leave to file an amici curiae brief.5 Consistent with the 
terms of our decision, Brooklyn Excelsior and NHA filed a brief in response to the brief 
by the UFT and NYSUT. We subsequently invited additional interested parties to file. 
amicus curiae briefs with respect to thefollowing question: , 
Does PERB retain jurisdiction under the Act and the New 
York Charter Schools Act of 1998 over representation 
matters concerning individuals employed at a charter school 
where the charter school is a party to a management * 
3
 Brooklyn Excelsior Charter Sch, 42 PERB fi4010 (2009). 
"Buffalo United Charter Sen, 43 PERB fl4009 (2010). 
5
 Brooklyn Excelsior Charter Sch, 43 PERB p 0 0 4 (2010). . 
oase INOS. O-OD/Z, tz-z^fzy & o-oo/'o -4-
v 
agreement with a private for-profit company for the operation 
of the school? 
In response to our solicitation, four additional amicus briefs were filed and 
Brooklyn Excelsior, Buffalo United, NHA, the Council and Association filed responses to 
those briefs. Direct invitations by the, Board to the New York State Board of Regents, 
the New York State Education Department, and the Charter Schools Institute of the 
State University of New York to file amicus briefs were declined. 
On September 21, 2010, oral argument was heard by the Board with respect to 
the common jurisdictional issues relevant to all three cases.6 
EXCEPTIONS 
In Cases C-5672 and E-2429, Brooklyn Excelsior and NHA contend in their 
exceptions that they constitute a joint public-private employer. They further argue that 
we are preempted from asserting jurisdiction to determine the question of 
representation because NHA is a private entity resulting in the joint employer being 
subject to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).7 At the same time, the exceptions 
by Brooklyn Excelsior and NHA challenge the ALJ's failure to designate the assistant 
principals as managerial under §201.7 of the Act. The Council supports the ALJ's 
decision to the extent that she rejected the jurisdictional argument raised by Brooklyn 
Excelsior and NHA, and denied their application that the at-issue positions be 
designated as managerial under the Act. 
• ' • • . ' • A 
6
 At the Board's request, the parties submitted supplemental briefs with respect to a 
decision issued by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Regional 13 Director in 
Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy Charter School Inc., Case 13-RM-1768 
(2010) and the Court of Appeals decision in New York Charter School Association v 
Smith, 15NY3d403(2010). 
7
 29 USC §151, etseq. 
With respect to its exceptions in Cases C-5672 and E-2429, the Council 
contends that the ALJ erred in dismissing its representation petition and in granting the 
application of Brooklyn Excelsior and NHA to designate assistant principals at Brooklyn 
Excelsior as confidential under the Act. • 
In Case C-5878, the Association's exceptions assert that the ALJ erred in 
dismissing its representation petition premised upon her conclusion that Buffalo United 
and NHA constitute a joint employer not covered by the Act because NHA is a private 
entity, and in failing to reject the argument that the NLRB had jurisdiction over Buffalo 
United. Buffalo United and NHA support the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, and after careful consideration of the 
arguments by the parties and amici, we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the decision 
of the ALJ in Cases C-5B72 and E-2429. We remand Case C-5672 to the assigned ALJ 
to ascertain the sufficiency of majority support for the Council, and we dismiss Case 
, E-2429. In Case C-5878., we reverse and remand the case to the ALJ assigned to that 
case to ascertain the sufficiency of majority support for the Association. 
FACTS 
Because of the complexity of the factual, and legal issues raised, we begin with a 
detailed recitation of the facts from the respective records. 
A. B rooklyn Excelsior8 
In 2001, an application was filed with the Charter Schools Institute of the State 
University of New York(Charter Schools Institute) seeking approval for the creation of 
Brooklyn Excelsior as a charter school under the Charter Schools Act, in conjunction 
with NHA. The application contained various attachments, which included: a) a 
8
 All record references in this portion of the decision are from the record in Cases 
C-5672 and E-2429. 
v-rdbt; iNuss. o-oo/z. , c-^.H^.a ex \s-ooio - u -
statement of Brooklyn Excelsior's intent to enter into a management agreement with 
NHA; b) a signed copy of.a June 2000 management agreement for a Michigan charter 
school; c) a statement regarding the nature and purpose of the partnership between 
Brooklyn Excelsior and NHA (partnership statement); d) a statement of the proposed 
organization of .the school; and e) a statement of the proposed responsibilities of the 
Brooklyn Excelsior Board of Trustees (Board of Trustees). 
The attachments contain inconsistencies regarding the precise nature of the 
. proposed relationship between Brooklyn Excelsior and NHA. The statement of 
proposed organization states that NHA will follow the "policies set by the Board and . 
offers administrative services and guidance in. the operation of the school, freeing the 
principal to run the day to day operations." The partnership statement avers that NHA 
will "aid in the selection and hiring of qualified personnel, including the School 
Administrator, to perform servibes at the school," "aid in the determination of staffing 
levels, and aid in the selection, evaluation, assigning, discipline, transfer and 
termination of personnel." At the same time, it states that NHA will be responsible for 
the management, operation and maintenance of the school including the authority to 
determine staffing as well as selecting, evaluating and terminating employees. The . 
statement of proposed responsibilities states that the Board of Trustees will be the 
employer "of the school staff and shalf govern the policies, procedures and expenditures 
> -
of the school" and that NHA is "responsible and accountable to the Board for the 
administration, operation and performance of the school." However, it also states that 
NHA shall have "the responsibility and authority to determine staffing levels, and to 
select, evaluate, assign, discipline, transfer and terminate personnel consistent with 
state and federal law." 
On February 1, 2002, the Board of Trustees of the State University of New York 
(SUNY Trustees) and the applicant entered into a proposed charter agreement (charter 
v • • 
agreement) allowing the applicant to organize and operate Brooklyn Excelsior as "an 
independent and autonomous public school." The charter agreement incorporates four 
exhibits: the charter application, an oversight plan, the policies regarding educational 
service providers, and additional assurances made by the charter applicant. 
The agreement mandates that Brooklyn Excelsior will, at all times, operate the 
school in accordance with the Charter Schools Act, and comply with all applicable laws, 
rules and regulations. In addition, it states that the'charter shall be governed by, subject 
to and construed under New York law. 
The agreement also defines the powers and authority of the Board of Trustees. 
The Board of Trustees "shall have final authority for policy and operational decisions of 
the School though nothing shall prevent the School Board from delegating decision-
making authority to officers and employees of the School Corporation."9 Under the 
charter agreement, the "School Board shall employ and contract with necessary 
teachers, administrators and other school personnel as set forth in the Application."10 
Section 4.5 of the charter agreement, entitled "Collective Bargaining," references 
the representation provisions from the Charter Schools Act, as well as the legislatively 
mandated access rights for employee'organizations seeking to represent charter school 
9
 For unexplained reasons, the agreement utilizes the term "School Corporation" instead 
of the statutory term "education corporation" utilized in Educ Law §2853.1. 
10
 In addition, the education corporation is required by §4.2 to make available in written 
form the personnel policies and responsibilities for teachers, administrators and other 
staff. . 
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employees.11 It also references the standards for charter revocation and termination 
under the Charter Schools Act, which include a finding by PERB that a charter school 
has engaged in a pattern and practice of interference or discrimination in violation of the 
Act.12 In addition, the charter agreement sets forth specific conditions regarding any 
agreement between Brooklyn Excelsior and a for-profit or not-for-profit entity to provide 
all or a substantial portion of the services necessary for the management and operation 
of the school. 
On March 19, 2002, the charter agreement was approved by the Board of 
Regents,, and it issued the charter incorporating Brooklyn Excelsior as an education 
( • 
corporation to operate a school in accordance with the Charter Schools Act and the 
charter agreement. The provisional charter issued by the Board of Regents designates 
a list of individuals as the Brooklyn Excelsior Board of Trustees with the power to adopt 
by-laws but it does not refer to NHA or "specify the extent of [its] participation in the 
management and operation of the school."13 
Following issuance of the charter, Brooklyn Excelsior entered into a management 
agreement with NHA (Brooklyn Excelsior-NHA agreement), which states that its terms 
are to be construed consistent with the charter, the Charter Schools Act and other New 
York State laws applicable to charter schools. Article l(B) of the Brooklyn Excelsior-
NHA agreement states: 
Contract; Charter Controlling. The School hereby contracts 
with NHA, to the extent permitted by law, for the provision of 
all labor,.materials, equipment, facilities and supervision 
11
 Employer Exhibit 50, §4.5. See also, Educ Law §§2854.3(b), (b-1) and (c-1); Niagara 
Charter Sch, 42 PERB P036 (2009). 
12
 Employer Exhibit 50, §§8.3 and 8.4; See also, Educ Law §2855.1(d). 
13
 See, Educ Law §2851.1. 
i^ase INUS. u - y o ; ^, d-^.t^.a ex u -ao / o - » -
necessary for the provision of educational services to 
students, and management, operation and maintenance of 
the charter school in accordance with the educational goals, 
curriculum, methods of pupil assessment, admission policy 
and criteria, school calendar and school day schedule, age 
and grade range of pupils to be enrolled, educational goals, 
and method to be used to monitor compliance with 
performance of targeted educational outcomes, all as 
adopted by the board of trustees of the School ("Board") and . 
included in the Charter between the School, the SUNY 
Trustees and the Regents. NHA and the School agree that 
the School shall be operated in full compliance with the 
Charter and all laws and regulations applicable to charter 
schools in the State of New York and that, in the event of a 
conflict between the Charter and this Agreement, the Charter 
will controlu (Emphasis added.) 
In addition, the management agreement dictates that it shall not "be construed as 
delegating to NHA the powers or authority of the Board, which are not subject to 
delegation by the Board under New York law," and that the rights under the agreement' 
shall be "construed according to the laws of the State of New York." The agreement 
describes NHA's relationship with Brooklyn Excelsior as that of an independent 
contractor, and specifies that "no agent or employee of NHA shall be deemed to be the 
agent or employee of the School." 
• • • • . ' 
Under the agreement, NHA is responsible for the management, operation, 
administration, and education at Brooklyn Excelsior subject to the powers and 
responsibilities of the Board of Trustees under the Charter Schools Act, the charter, arid 
Brooklyn Excelsior's budget and funding.15 NHA's responsibilities over school 
personnel are subject to the Board of Trustees' final authority. These responsibilities 
include: managing all personnel functions including professional development of the 
14
 Employer Exhibit 11, pp. 1-2. 
15
 The primary revenue sources for Brooklyn Excelsior are federal,' state and local 
funding. Employer Exhibit 11, Article V. 
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administrators and all instructional staff, recommending qualified personnel to the Board 
of Trustees, determining staffing levels and assignments, supervising and evaluating 
staff, coordinating and administering payroll and employee benefits "and with Board 
approval, hire, discipline and terminate personnel working at the School, all in a manner 
that is consistent with state and federal law." 
The agreement outlines NHA's role with regard to school administrators, 
teachers and support staff. The Board of Trustees and NHA are required to "consult in 
good faith with each other with respect to and agree upon NHA's selection, supervision, 
discipline, retention, transfer and termination" of school administrators. NHA's 
determinations regarding the duties and terms of employment of administrators are also 
subject to Board of Trustees approval. 
Under the terms of the management agreement NHA has the authority, with 
respect to instructional and support staff, to "select and hire qualified teachers and 
assign them to the grade levels and subjects as required, for the School to operate in 
accordance with the terms of its Charter" and to determine the number and functions of 
support staff and to provide qualified support staff. NHA has the discretion to utilize 
teachers and support staff on a full-time or part-time basis. However, all NHA 
decisions, and its application of discretion under the agreement with respect to staffing,^ 
must be "consistent with the agreed upon Budget, the Education Program and 
applicable law."16 
16
 Employer Exhibit. 11, Article VI(F). The management agreement assigns NHA a 
number of additional responsibilities including: the implementation and administration of 
the educational program; preparation of an annual budget for School Board approval; in 
consultation with the School Board, the leasing of a facility for the school; all aspects of 
business administration and accounting operations; food, transportation and health 
services; the marketing and development of the school; procurement of all insurance; 
recommending and enforcing all rules, regulations and procedures applicable to the 
school; and implementing pupil performance evaluations. 
uase NOS. u-Dd/z, t-Z4zy & u-D.ts/o - v i -
The facts regarding NHA's role at Brooklyn Excelsior since it began operations in 
2003 are largely undisputed. From its principal Michigan offices, NHA's People 
Services Department directly performs numerous personnel-related duties relating to 
Brooklyn Excelsior assistant principals and other staff including: recruiting; advertising 
vacant positions; conducting regional and centralized training; transferring NHA 
employees to Brooklyn Excelsior; conducting background checks and ensuring 
compliance with state certification requirements; issuing NHA form employment offer . 
.letters; determining staffing levels; determining salaries consistent with Brooklyn 
Excelsior's budget; administering NHA medical, dental, vacation, holiday and sick leave 
benefits; issuing paychecks drawn from an NHA bank account; issuing W-2 tax forms; 
administering a direct deposit program, a 401 (k) program, flexible spending accounts, a 
life insurance plan, and a tuition reimbursement program; maintaining personnel files; 
and preparing and distributing the standard NHA employee handbook setting forth the 
terms and conditions of employment, rules of conduct and policies applicable to NHA 
employees nationwide: In addition, decisions with respect to the hiring, evaluation, 
promotion, discipline and termination of staff at Brooklyn Excelsior are made in 
consultation with NHA's Michigan professional staff. The hiring and termination of all 
assistant principals and teachers, however, are subject to approval by the Board of 
Trustees. 
In the 2005-06 school year, NHA Director of School Quality Irwin Kurz (Kurz) 
functioned as the Brooklyn Excelsior principal. In April 2006, NHA employee Thomas 
DeMarco (DeMarco) joined Kiirz as his special assistant at the school, and DeMarco 
became the school's principal for the 2006-07 school year after separate interviews with 
NHA and the Board of Trustees. As NHA Director of School Quality, Kurz remains 
responsible for transferring NHA employees to Brooklyn Excelsior. In their testimony, 
uase NOS. ^-oo/v, t-z4zy & u-o«/s -iz-
DeMarco and NHA Employee Relations Manager Chad Fridma (Fridma) opined that all 
professional staff at Brooklyn Excelsior, including assistant principals, are NHA 
employees although, the Board of Trustees has authority to approve or disapprove 
hiring and termination decisions. 
During the 2006-07 school year, four assistant principals worked at Brooklyn 
Excelsior, each of whom was approved by the Board of Trustees: Nadia Kalman 
(Kalman), Leslie King (King), Peter Katcher (Katcher) and Holly Hillary (Hillary). When 
Kalman was hired, she was sent an offer of employment letter signed by DeMarco on , 
behalf of NHA. The offer letter set forth her level of compensation and other terms and 
conditions of employment. It also stated that her employment was contingent on the 
completion of background and reference checks, and her submission of additional 
documentation. Kalman was terminated in January 2007, with the approval of the 
Board of Trustees. 
Along with DeMarco, assistant principals and other key personnel are members 
of the school leadership team responsible for instructional issues at the school. During 
bi-weekly meetings with DeMarco, assistant.principals can offer advice and opinions on 
curricula, teaching methodology, test preparation and other pedagogical and 
administrative issues. 
The duties of assistant principals include drafting job postings, pre-screening job 
applicants, participating in interviews, and observing demonstration lessons. Qualified 
candidates are referred to DeMarco for an interview; he makes the hiring determination 
in conjunction with NHA, which is then presented to the Board of Trustees for approval. 
Assistant principals supervise, evaluate and train teaching staff, conduct formal and 
informal teacher observations, implement curricula and special education requirements, 
and help to ensure a safe and orderly school environment. Recommendations and 
Case NOS. C-5b /2 , b-^429 & C-bb/'S -13-
documentation with respect to the discipline of staff are discussed by DeMarco and the 
assistant principals. From time to time, DeMarco also discusses financial matters with 
the assistant principals on topics such as state lunch reimbursements, and budgetary 
allotments. During her testimony, assistant principal Kalman testified that she did not 
have authority to impose discipline, and she was not consulted when teachers were 
given bonuses in December 2006. 
B. Buffalo United17 x 
In 2002, an application was filed with the Charter Schools Institute seeking 
approval for the creation of a proposed charter school now known as Buffalo United.18 
The application identified NHA as a proposed management organization and included a 
management partner term sheet stating that the school intended to create a partnership 
with NHA.19 
The Buffalo United application and attachments are similar but not identical to 
•r 
those filed by Brooklyn Excelsior. The Buffalo United application contained various 
attachments including: a) a management partner term sheet; b) copies of management 
agreements between NHA and charter schools in Michigan and Rochester, New York; 
c) a statement of the proposed organization of the school; d) statements of the 
17
 All record references in this portion of the decision are from the record in Case 
C-5878. , 
18
 The education corporation was originally named and chartered as the Libertas Charter 
School. On March 25, 2003, the Board of Regents' approved a-charter amendment to 
rename the education corporation as Brooklyn United. Joint Exhibits 1 and 2. 
19
 Joint Exhibit 2, Attachment 9(a). Based upon the terms of the management partner 
term sheet attached to the application, "we reject the Association's suggestion that the 
application did not declare an intention to partner with NHA. See, Brief in Support of 
Exceptions on Behalf of the Petitioner, p. 4. 
uase INOS. u-Gb/'z, L-Z4zy & u-Db/o -14-
proposed responsibilities of Buffalo United Board of Trustees (Board of Trustees) and 
NHA; and e) proposed personnel policies. 
The proposed Buffalo United personnel policies state that the Board of Trustees 
will have ultimate responsibility over the hiring and firing of staff based upon 
recommendations from school administrators and NHA, and that NHA would be 
responsible for recruiting, screening, background checks and certification verification. 
The management partner term sheet states that Buffalo United intended to contract with 
NHA to: "[p]rovide all labor/materials, equipment, facilities and supervision necessary 
for the provision of educational services to students, and the management, operation 
and maintenance of the school"; assist "in the selection and hiring of qualified 
personnel"; and "[a]id in the determination of staffing levels, and aid in the selection, 
evaluation, assigning, discipline, transfer and termination of personnel." NHA would 
also be responsible for notifying the Board of Trustees of any labor or employee 
problems, and NHA would provide training and professional development to all teaching 
staff on a regular basis. , 
The statement of proposed responsibilities states that the Board of Trustees will 
govern Buffalo United with air of the powers and duties permitted by law to manage the 
school's affairs and is responsible for assuring that the school operates in accordance 
with the charter and all applicable federal and state laws. In addition, it provides that 
The functions which NHA will manage and administer 
include, but are not limited to: the educational program; 
personnel recruitment and recommendation; maintenance 
and operation of the school building; business administration 
of the school; extracurricular activities and programs; / 
professional development of the Principal and instructional 
personnel; and the selection and acquisition of the 
instructional materials, equipment and supplies.20 
20
 Joint Exhibit 2, Attachment 28, p. 2. 
uase NOS. U-DS/Z, b-Z4zy & u-sts^o -10-
Furthermore, it states that NHA will operate the administrative functions of the school 
and select and hire qualified personnel, determine staffing levels, and "select, evaluate, 
assign, discipline, transfer and terminate personnel consistent with state and federal 
law."
 N - . ' • _ ' 
The SUNY Trustees and the applicant entered into a charter agreement for the 
establishment and operation of Buffalo United as "ah independent and autonomous 
public school." The charter agreement is similar in most respects to the charter 
agreement entered into with Brooklyn. Excelsior. It incorporates the charter application, 
an oversight plan, the policies regarding educational service providers, and additional 
assurances made by the charter applicant., The agreement also includes a provision 
identical to that in the Brooklyn Excelsior agreement with respect to the power and 
authority of the Board of Trustees: it "shall have final authority for policy and operational 
decisions of the School though nothing shall prevent the School Board from delegating 
decision-making authority to officers and employees of the School Corporation."21 
In addition, §4 of the charter agreement contains the same personnel and 
collective bargaining provisions as in the Brooklyn Excelsior agreement. Section 4.1 
states that the Board of Trustees shall employ and contract with school personnel 
consistent with the application. Section 4.5 references the representation and employee 
organization access rights set forth in the Charter Schools Act. In addition, the 
agreement places conditions on an agreement that Buffalo United may enter into with a 
for-profit or not-for-profit entity to manage and operate the school. Finally, it mandates 
that Buffalo United operate the school in accordance with the Charter Schools Act and 
21
 Joint Exhibit 3, §2.12. Like the Brooklyn Excelsior charter agreement, the education 
corporation is referenced as the "School Corporation" despite the nomenclature of the 
Charter Schools Act. 
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all applicable laws, rules and regulations. In addition, it dictates that the charter will be 
governed by, subject to and construed under New York law. 
On September 13, 2002, the charter agreement was approved by the Board of 
Regents, and a charter was issued to a school corporation, later renamed Buffalo 
United, to operate the school in accordance with the provisions of the Charter Schools 
Act and the charter agreement. The charter issued by the Board of Regents designated 
a list of individuals to function as the Board of Trustees with the power to adopt by-laws. 
Like the provisional charter issued for Brooklyn Excelsior, it did not reference NHA, nor 
did it specify the extent of NHA's participation in the management and operation of the 
school. 
On June 4, 2003, Buffalo United entered Into a management agreement with 
NHA (Buffalo United-NHA agreement) virtually identical to the Brooklyn Excelsior-NHA 
agreement described supra22 The agreement includes the same Article l(B) stipulating 
that the agreement's terms are to be construed consistent with the charter, the Charter 
Schools Act and other New York laws and regulations applicable to charter schools. It 
describes NHA's relationship with Buffalo United as an independent contractor, 
specifies that "no agent or employee of NHA shall, be deemed to be the agent or 
employee of the School," dictates that the agreement shall not "be construed as 
delegating to NHA the powers or authority of the Board, which are not subject to 
delegation by the Board under New York law" and that the rights under the agreement 
shall be "construed according to the laws of the State of New York." 
The agreement grants NHA the responsibility to manage, operate, and 
administer Buffalo United subject to the powers, responsibilities and authority of the 
22
 Joint Exhibit 1, Exhibit 3. However, the minor differences in the two management 
agreements have no relevance to determining the jurisdictional issues before the Board. 
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Board of Trustees under the Charter Schools Act, the charter, and the school's budget 
and funding.23 
The parties have stipulated to the personnel-related duties performed by NHA at 
Buffalo United, which largely mirror NHA's role at Brooklyn Excelsior. Subject to Board 
of Trustees approval, NHA is responsible for recruiting, hiring and training instructional 
and support staff at Buffalo United. NHA issues form offer letters to prospective 
employees, setting forth terms and conditions of employment, which are consistent with 
those applicable to employees in other NHA managed schools. NHA's other 
responsibilities include: conducting background and reference checks, ensuring 
compliance with certification requirements, determining employee salaries, issuing 
paychecks, reimbursing for travel expenses, administering a direct deposit program and 
a 401 (k) program, and offering medical, dental, vacation, disability, holiday, sick leave, 
life insurance, and tuition reimbursement benefits. Finally, employees at Buffalo United 
receive NHA's standard employee handbook, which describes their terms and 
conditions of employment, including rules of conduct, compensation and policies. 
C. NHA24 ; 
NHA is a private for-profit charter school management company with annual 
gross revenues in excess of one million dollars. NHA manages dozens of charter 
schools nationwide, employing approximately 4,000 people who are unrepresented by 
an employee or labor organization. NHA's corporate offices are located in Grand 
23
 Buffalo United's primary revenue sources are federal, state and local funding. Joint 
Exhibit 1, Exhibit 3, Article V. 
24
 All record references in this portion of. the decision are from the record in Case 
C-5878. 
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Rapids, Michigan, where most of the personnel functions are performed with respect to 
employees working at Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United. 
DISCUSSION 
Our discussion regarding the common jurisdictional issues in these cases begins 
with the system of charter schools created by the New York Legislature in the Charter 
Schools Act. This statutory scheme is directly relevant to determining whether a joint 
public-private employer relationship exists at the two charter schools and whether our 
jurisdiction over the questions of representation are preempted by the NLRA. 
The best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language utilized in the Charter 
Schools Act.25 When statutory language is unambiguous, it alone is determinative, and 
the construction of the statute must give effect to the plain meaning of the words 
utilized.26 Alternatively, legislative intent can be implied from the statutory scheme of 
the law.27 One of the fundamental rules of statutory construction requires that a statute 
be "construed as a whole, and that all parts of an act are to be read and construed 
together to determine the legislative intent."28 After the Legislature has set the public 
25
 Webster Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 75 NY2d 619, 627, 23 
PERB 5J7013 (1990). 
26
 See, Charter Development Co v City of Buffalo, 6 NY3d 578, 581-583 (2006) 
(concluding that the tax exemption provision in the Charter Schools Act is clear and 
unambiguous and holding that a for-profit Michigan charter school development 
company, which owned the property leased to Buffalo United was not entitled to a tax 
exemption under Educ Law §2853.1(d)). See also, Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 
455 (2000). Daimler Chrysler Corp v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653 (2006); Excellus Health Plan, 
Inc. v Serio, 2 NY3d 166 (2004). 
27
 Webster Cent Sch Distv New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, supra, note 25. 
Statutes, §97; Golden v Koch, 49 NY2d 690, 694 (1980). 
uase INOS. u-oo/z, t-<i4zy & u-oo/o -iy-
policy choices for the State, it is not within the authority of PERB or the courts to 
interfere with or reject those choices.29 
A. Th e Charter Schools Act's Regulatory Scheme 
The Charter Schools Act was designed to create a system of charter schools to 
provide "opportunities for teachers, parents, and community members to establish and 
maintain schools that operate independently of existing schools and school districts" 
aimed at seeking to accomplish certain expressed educational objectives.30 Under the 
law, charter schools are public schools created, supervised, and subject to abolition by 
> 
the Board of Regents and the applicable charter entity.31 Charter schools can "provide 
new alternatives within the local public education system that would offer the greatest 
education benefit to students."32 . v 
By definition, the powers of a charter school constitute "the performance of 
essential public purposes and government purposes of this state," and the charter 
school is "deemed an independent and autonomous public school."33 Furthermore, all 
charter schools are funded directly by school districts with public funds.34 If a school 
district fails to fund a charter school as mandated by the Charter Schools Act, the State 
Comptroller is required to "deduct from any state funds which become due to such 
29
 Morales v County.of Nassau, 94 NY2d 218 (1999). 
30
 Educ Law §§2850.2(a)-(f); New York Charter Sch Assn v DiNapoli, 13 NY3d 120 
(2009). 
31
 Educ Law §§2852, 2853, 2854 and 2855. 
32
 Educ Law §2852.9-a(b). . . 
33
 Educ Law §§2853.1 (c) and (d). In addition, they are among the entities that are 
subject to the Freedom of Information Law and Open Meetings Law. Educ Law 
§2854.1 (e); Pub Off Law Articles 6 and 7; NYSUT v Brighter Choice Charter Sch, 15 
NY3d 560, 43 PERBJJ7509 (2010). 
34 Educ Law §2856. 
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school district anamount equal to the unpaid obligation," and make payment of that 
amount to the charter school.35 ' 
The process for creating Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United began with the 
filing of an application with a charter entity, defined by Education Law §2851.3 as the 
Board of Regents, SUNY Trustees, the Board of Education of a school district that 
encompasses the geographical boundary in which the charter will operate or the 
Chancellor of the New York City School District for charter schoolsto be located within 
the City of New York.36 The charter entity for Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United is 
the SUNY Trustees, whose members are appointees of the Governor, subject to 
confirmation by the State Senate.37 
The charter application may be filed by individuals in conjunction with entities 
such as a college, university, museum, education institution, a not-for-profit corporation 
or a "for-profit business or corporate entity authorized to do business in New York 
state."38 However, the Charter Schools Act creates a uniform regulatory system for all 
35
 Educ Law §2856.2. 
36
 Educ Law §2851.3(a)-(c); New York Charter Sch Assn v DiNapoli, supra, note 30. In 
2010, the Charter Schools Act was amended to authorize the Board of Regents to issue 
an additional 260 charters in New York utilizing a competitive request for proposals 
process. L. 2010, c- 101. The competitive application process for the creation of the 
additional charter schools includes certain procedural differences from the application 
process that led to the creation of Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United. Educ Law 
§2852.9-a. Like the charter schools in the present cases, however, the new charter 
schools can not be created without direct enabling actions by the SUNY Trustees and 
the Board of Regents. • 
37
 Educ Law §353. • ' " - • 
38
 Educ Law §2851.1. The name of a proposed charter school "shall not include the 
name or identification of a for-profit business or corporate entity." Educ Law §2851.2(k). 
In addition, a for-profit business or corporate entity is ineligible to submit an application 
to establish a charter school under Educ Law §2852.9-a or to operate or manage such a 
school. Educ Law §2851.1. 
Uase NOS. U-bb /2 , h-2429 & U-bb^b - Z 1 -
charter schools regardless of whether the school was created and/or is managed in 
conjunction with a for-profit corporate venture or with any other entity. 
An application for the creation of a charter school must include a proposed 
governing structure along with the identification and background information of .all 
applicants and the proposed members of the Board of Trustees.39 A code of ethics for 
the proposed school must also be included in the application along with "standards with 
respect to disclosure of conflicts of interest regarding any matter brought before the" 
Board of Trustees.40 In addition, the application must contain information about the 
"hiring and personnel policies and procedures of the school, including the qualifications 
to be used in the hiring of teachers, school administrators and other school employees, 
and a description of staff responsibilities."41 As part of the application review process,; 
all individual applicants are subject to criminal background checks by the charter 
entity.42 An,application will not be approved by a charter entity unless it is demonstrated 
that, inter alia, the "charter school described in the application meets the requirements 
set out in this article and all other applicable laws, rules and regulations."43 
If the charter entity approves the application, the Charter Schools Act requires 
the applicant and the charter entity to enter into a proposed written agreement 
permitting the charter school to be organized and operated.44 The agreement must 
include the "terms or conditions required by applicable laws, rules and regulations," "any 
39
 Educ Law §§2851.2(c) and (m). 
40EducLaw§2851.2(v). 
41
 Educ Law §2851.2(g). 
42
 Educ Law §2852.4. 
43
 Educ Law §2852.2(a). 
44
 Educ Law §2852.5. 
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other terms or conditions, not inconsistent with law, agreed upon by the applicant and 
the charter entity" and "the specific commitments of the charter entity relating to its 
obligations to oversee and supervise the charter school."45 The Court of Appeals, 
however, has concluded that a charter agreement constitutes only "an authorizing 
agreement under which an agency has determined that an applicant school.is 
competent to be licensed as an education corporation and nothing more."46 (Emphasis 
added.) 
Under the Charter Schools Act, the Board of Regents, a public body that governs 
the University of the State of New York, is the sole entity authorized to issue a school 
charter, which can not exceed five years.47 Members of the Board of Regents are 
elected by the Legislature and are state officers or employees.48 The Board of Regents 
is obligated to submit a report to the Governor and legislative leaders each year, which 
sets forth information about charter)schools, including a "list of all actions taken by a 
charter entity on charter application and the rationale for the renewal or revocation of 
any charters."49 . • r, 
Throughout the chartering process, the Board of Regents and the charter entity 
are obligated.to provide notification to the school district and the public where the 
charter school is located. Prior to issuance of a charter, a public hearing must be held 
by the school district to obtain comments from the members of the community. If the 
45
 Supra, note 44. , 
46
 New York Charter Sch Assn v Smith, supra, note 6, 15 NY3d at 409. 
47
 Educ Law §§202, 2851.2(p), 2851.3. See, Bd of Educ of Roosevelt Union Free Sch 
Dist v Bd of Trustees, 282 AD2d 166, 169 (3d Dept 2001). 
48
 Educ Law. §202, Pub; Off Law §73.1 (i)(i). 
49
 Educ Law §2857.3(d). 
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public hearing is not conducted by the school district, the Board of Regents must 
conduct the hearing.50 
Upon receipt of a proposed agreement, the Board of Regents must review it to 
ensure that it satisfies the standards set forth in Education Law §2852.2.51 If the Board 
of Regents decides to issue a charter, it must incorporate the charter school as an 
"education corporation" for a term not to exceed five years.52 When a charter school is 
created in conjunction with a for-profit business or corporate entity, the Charter Schools 
Act mandates that the charter issued by the Board of Regents specify the extent to 
which that entity will participate in the management and the operation of the school.53 
After its incorporation, a charter school is subject to the supervision and oversight 
by a "public agent" or "public agents": the applicable charter entity and the Board of 
Regents, if it is not the charter entity.54 Such oversight and supervision includes 
examining and inspecting the charter school and its records to ensure "that the charter 
school is in compliance with all applicable laws, regulations and charter provisions."55 In 
addition, the school district where a charter school is located has the right to visit, 
50
 Educ Law §§2857.1 and 2857.1-a. 
51
 Educ Law §2852.5-a. 
52
 Educ Law §2853.1; New York Charter Sch Assn v Smith, supra, note 6. In Bd of Educ 
of Roosevelt Union Free Sch Dist v Bd of Trustees, 282 AD2d 166, 174 (3d Dept 2001), 
the Appellate Division, Third Department stated, however, that "the Board of Regents is 
powerless under the Charter Schools Act to reject or to veto a proposed charter 
submitted to it by the SUNY Trustees." 
53
 Educ Law §2851.1. For-profit businesses and corporate entities, however, are 
ineligible to submit a charter school application to establish a charter school pursuant to 
Education Law §2852.9-a or to operate or mange a school with a charter issued 
pursuant to that provision. L 2010, c 101. 
54
 Educ Law §§2853.1 (c), 2853.2 and 2-a. New York Charter Sch Assn v DiNapoli, 
supra, note 30. 
55
 Educ Law §§2853.2 and 2-a. 
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examine and inspect the school to ensure "that the school is in compliance with all 
applicable laws, regulations and charter provisions."56 
All charter schools are required to comply with the conflict of interests provisions 
applicable to school districts.57 A charter school trustee or employee who knowingly 
and intentionally engages in certain prohibited acts defined by.New York law, including 
accepting or soliciting gifts, can be removed from office or employment.58 Charter 
schools are obligated to adopt and circulate a code of ethics for their officers and 
employees. Such codes must include standards for officers and employees regarding 
disclosure of interest in legislation before the local governing body, holding of 
investments in conflict with official duties, private employment in conflict with official 
duties, and future employment.59 . -
Furthermore, each charter school is obligated to file an annual report with the 
applicable charter entity and the Board of Regents. The annual report must contain a 
i 
statement of fiscal performance, including expenditures for employee salaries and 
benefits.60 This fiscal monitoring is required because charter schools are funded almost 
' exclusively with public monies. The "school district of residence" makes direct payments 
. . . / 
r to the charter school for the cost of tuition for each student who resides in that school 
56
 Educ Law §2853.2-a. 
57
 Educ Law §2854.1(f); Gen Mun Law §§800-806. The obligation of charter schools to 
comply with the conflicts of interests provisions was added to the Charter Schools Act in 
2010. L2010, c 101, §18. 
58
 Gen Mun Law §§805-a:1 and 2. 
59
 Gen Mun Law §806.1(a). 
60
 Educ Law §2857.2(c); 8 NYCRR §119.3(c)(2); New York Charter Sch Assn v 
DiNapoli, supra, note 30. 
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district enrolled in that charter school.61 This, obligation on school districts to fund a 
charter school is subject to state regulations administered by the Commissioner of • 
Education.62 
A charter entity or the Board of Regents can terminate or revoke a charterT 
pursuant-to Education Law §2855.1, upon one of four bases: a) a lack of sufficient 
student achievement; b) serious violations of law; c) a material and substantial violation 
of the charter; or d) a decision by this agency finding that the charter school has 
engaged in a pattern and practice of violating §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act by 
interfering with or discriminating against employees engaging in the right to form, join 
and participate in employee organization activities under the Act.63 Evidence of 
violations of law or the charter obtained during an inspection by a charter entity or the 
Board of Regents can form the basis for the termination or revocation of a charter.64 
PERB's preliminary adjudicatory role in the charter revocation process is set forth 
in Education Law §2855.1 (d), which states that any charter can be revoked or 
terminated: 
When the public employment relations board makes a 
r determination that the charter school demonstrates a 
practice and pattern of egregious and intentional violations of 
subdivision one of section two hundred nine-a of the civil 
service\law involving interference with or discrimination 
against employee rights under article fourteen of the civil 
service law. (Emphasis added.) 
61
 Educ Law §2856.1. Nevertheless, the Charter Schools Act permits supplemental 
private funding or other assistance to a charter school. Educ Law §2856.3. 
628.NYCRR§119.1. 
63
 As we noted recently in NYCTA, 43 PERB 1J3038, n 9 (2010), we have never. 
recognized a pattern and practice claim under the Act. However, Educ Law §2855.1 
explicitly grants us jurisdiction to hear such claims against a charter school. 
New York Charter Sch Assn v DiNapoli, supra, note 30. 
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Pursuant to Education Law §§2854.3(c-2) and 2855.1(d), acts by a charter school's 
Board of Trustees, the chief administrative officer and other agents can constitute an 
improper practice under the Act, and such practices can form the basis for the 
revocation or termination of a charter. 
Upon revocation of a charter, the charter school students, student records and 
charter school assets are transferred to the school district in which the charter school 
was located.65 
The Charter Schools Act grants the Board of Regents and the applicable charter 
entity the power and responsibility to investigate and remedy a complaint by any 
individual or group alleging that the charter school is violating the provisions of the 
Charter Schools Act, the charter, or any other provision of law "relating to the • 
management and operation of the charter school."66 The New York State Education 
Department Commissioner has been delegated authority to receive, investigate and 
respond to all such complaints filed with the Board of Regents, and the power to issue 
appropriate remedial orders against charter schools.67 
Prior to expiration of a charter, a renewal application can.be filed with the charter 
entity. A charter may be renewed only after a review by the Board of Regents and the 
charter entity. Prior to approval of a renewal application, the school district where the 
school is located must conduct a public hearing with respect to the renewal application. 
In the alternative, the Board of Regents must conduct the hearing.68 
65EducLaw§2851.2(t). 
66
 Edu'c Law §2855.4. 
57
 8 NYCRR§3.16. J 
68
 Educ Law §§2857.1 and 2857.1-a. 
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B. Th e Legislature Intended PERB to Have Jurisdiction over Charter Schools 
NHA, Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United contend that we lack jurisdiction to 
determine the representation issues presented in these cases because the employers 
at both charter schools are joint employers, each with NHA as a private entity 
component. They argue that the facts demonstrate the existence of joint public-private 
employer relationships at Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United based upon NHA's 
substantial control of the management and operations of the schools, including setting 
and administering the terms and conditions of employment. In support of their 
argument, they cite precedent under the Act holding that we lack jurisdiction over joint 
public-private employers because the employment in such cases is not unequivocally or 
substantially public. This jurisdictional argument is supported by amicus New York City 
Board of Education, which concedes that there is an arguable conflict between the 
provisions of the Charter Schools Act and the Act on the question of jurisdiction.69 
The Association and Council contend that the text of the Charter Schools Act 
expressly grants us jurisdiction over all charter schools, and renders our joint public-
private employer precedent inapplicable. Amici American Federation of Teachers 
(AFT), National Education Association (NEA), New York State United Teachers 
(NYSUT), and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) support the textually-based 
arguments made by the Association and Council. NHA, Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo 
United do not. 
Based upon our careful examination of the provisions of the Charter Schools Act, 
we conclude that it explicitly and implicitly makes the Act applicable to every New York 
charter school. The education corporation established by the Board of Regents to 
Brief of Amicus Curiae New York City Department of Education, p. 13. 
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operate a charter school is the sole employer of its employees under the statute. This is 
true regardless of whether the charter application was filed in conjunction with a for-
profit business and whether the school is managed, in conjunction with that business. 
In light of the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Charter Schools Act, the 
role that NHA has been permitted to play by the Board of Trustees at each school is not 
determinative of the outcome in these cases. The Legislature made a series of public 
policy choices in enacting the Charter Schools Act including mandating that the law's 
provisions supersede any other inconsistent state and local laws or regulations 
including the Act. In addition, the Legislature codified a labor relations system in the 
Charter Schools Act applicable to all charter schools, which is inconsistent with our 
precedent with respect to joint employer relationships, as well as other procedures, 
standards and rights under the Act. These statutory labor .relations provisions are 
explicitly referenced in the charter agreement reached between the SUNY Trustees and 
each charter school. ' ' J ' 
In the absence of the terms of the statute that created New York's system of 
charter schools, we would conclude that NHA's role at each school demonstrates joint 
' ' c 
public-private employer relationships with Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United under 
our prior precedent.70 However, we find that our joint public-private employer. 
relationship precedent, as well as our authority under §201.6(b) of the Act to designate 
70
 See, New York Public Library v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 45 AD2d 271, 7 
PERB H7013 (1st Dept 1974), affd 37 NY2d 752, 8 PERB 1J7013 (1975); Niagara 
Frontier Trans Auth, 13 PERB 1J3003 (1980); Jacob K Javits Convention Center, 20 
PERB 1J3030 (1987); State of New York (State University of New York—SUNY at 
Buffalo), 35 PERB f[3019 (2002). See also, Mamaroneck Union Free Sch Dist, 38 
PERB 1J4016 (2005); Berkshire Farm Union Free. Sch Dist, 23 PERB fl4035 (1990). 
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a joint public employer for a charter school, has been superseded by the Charter 
Schools Act.71 
The Legislature has mandated that the provisions of the Charter Schools Act are 
to have supremacy over all other inconsistent provisions of New York law, including the 
Act. Education Law §2854.1(a) states: 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to the 
extent that any provision of this article is inconsistent with 
any other state or local law, rule or regulation, the provisions 
of this article shall govern and be controlling. 
Similarly, the charter agreements and the management agreements for both schools 
acknowledge the supremacy of the Charter Schools Act and require that the schools be 
operated consistent with the statute. 
Although charter schools perform essential public and government purposes, the 
Legislature has chosen to treat charter schools as public schools for most, but not all 
purposes.72 As the Court of Appeals has stated "[w]hen the Legislature intended 
charter schools to be subject to particular laws governing public entities, it has said 
so."73 We conclude that Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United and their employees are 
covered by the Act and are subject to our jurisdiction because the Legislature explicitly 
and unambiguously "said so" in the Charter Schools Act. 
71
 See, International High School v Mills, 276 AD2d 165 (3d Dept 2000) (Regents 
examination requirement of Charter Schools Act supersedes prior variances granted to 
a school under the Twenty-First Century School Act, Educ Law §309-a.) 
72
 "There are certain instances in Education Law §2853 in which the Legislature has 
determined a charter school should be considered a private school such as: (1) the 
power to designate textbooks, to purchase textbooks, to loan textbooks and to purchase 
supplies; (2) the designation of school library materials; (3) the designation of software 
programs to be used in conjunction with its computers; (4) local zoning, land use 
regulation, and building code compliance; and (5) student transportation." New York 
Charter Sch Assn v DiNapoli, supra, note 30, fn 4. 
New York Charter Sch Assn v Smith, supra, note 6, 15 NY3d at 410. 
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A charter school's Board of Trustees is required by statute to "employ and 
contract with necessary teachers, administrators and other school personnel" and has 
"final authority for policy and operational decisions of the school" and the authority to 
delegate "decision-making authority to officers and employees of the school in 
accordance with the provisions of the charter."74 Upon the hiring or termination of an 
employee, the Board of Trustees is obligated to report to the Commissioner of 
Education the name and position of the employee.75 
For purposes of the Act, Education Law §2854.3(a) expressly defines a charter 
school as a public employer, a Board of Trustees as a Board of Education, and a 
charter school employee as a public employee. In addition, it states that a charter 
school employee is an employee of the education corporation created to operate the 
school. The section also references a charter school having a "chief executive officer," 
which is a term of art under the Act.76 By definition, a "chief executive officer" is the only 
' . . . 
agent of a public employer who may enter into a negotiated written contract with an 
employee organization.77 \
 v 
Education Law §2854.3(a) is unambiguous that the Act applies to all charter 
schools and their employees: 
An employee of a charter school shall be an employee of the 
education corporation formed to operate the charter school 
and not an employee of the local school district in which the 
charter school is located. An employee of a charter school 
shall be deemed to be a public employee solely for purposes 
of article fourteen of the civil service law, except for section 
74
 Educ Law §§226.7, 2853.1(b) and (f), and 2854,3(a-1). 
75
 Educ Law §2854.3(a-3). 
76
 See, §§201.10, 201.12 and 210 of the Act. 
77
 Section 201.12 of the Act. 
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two hundred twelve of such law, and for no other purposes 
unless otherwise specified in this article, the board of 
trustees of the charter school shall constitute a board of 
education solely for purposes of article fourteen of the civil 
service law, except for section two hundred twelve of such 
law, and for no other purposes unless otherwise specified in 
this article, a charter school shall be deemed to be a public 
employer solely for purposes of article fourteen of the civil 
service law, except for section two hundred twelve of such 
law, and.for no other purposes unless otherwise specified in 
this article, and the chief executive officer of the charter 
school shall be the person designated as such by the board 
of trustees of the charter school: (Emphasis added.) 
The plain and mandatory language of Education Law §2854.3(a) demonstrates 
. that an education corporation formed to operate a charter school is the only employer of 
the school under the Charter Schools Act, and that employer is a public employer for 
purposes of the Act. Education Law §2854.3(a) does not recognize or countenance a 
joint public-private employer relationship or a joint public employer relationship under 
§201.6(b) of the Act at a charter school. If the Legislature intended to permit exceptions 
to the statutory mandate that charter school employees are employees of a single public 
employer for purposes of the Act, it could have done so explicitly. Instead, it created a 
uniform charter school labor relations system that does not draw a distinction between a 
charter school that manages itself and one created and/or operated in conjunction with 
another entity. In addition, the Charter Schools Act expressly exempts all charter 
schools and charter school employees from the jurisdiction of local government labor 
relations agencies created pursuant to §212 of the Act. 
In contrast, when the Legislature created the Erie County Medical Center 
Corporation it expressly defined the relationship between that public benefits 
corporation, the corporate employees, and the County of Erie for purposes of the Act: 
employees of the corporation shall, for all purposes of article 
fourteen of the civil service law, be deemed to be employees 
of the county of "Erie and shall be employed within the ', 
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current county of Erie bargaining unit designation. The 
county office of labor relations shall, for all purposes of 
article fourteen of the civil service law, act as agent for the 
corporation and shall, with respect to the corporation, have 
all the power and duties provided under article twenty-four of 
the executive law..The corporation and the county shall 
recognize the existing certified or recognized employee 
organization of county employees as the exclusive collective 
bargaining representatives for such employees.78 
Significantly, the Charter Schools Act creates a single employer for each charter 
school and does not have a section that creates or authorizes a joint employer 
relationship similar to that created by the Erie County Medical Center Corporation Act. 
Moreover, the latter enabling legislation applies only to that public benefit corporation, 
whereas the Charter School Act applies to all New York charter schools. 
The Legislature's intent to treat labor relations at all charter schools in a uniform 
manner under the Act is confirmed by Education Law §§2854.3(c-2) and 2855.1(d), 
which create a distinct improper employer practice applicable only to charter.schools 
and their agents for violating §209-a.1 of the Act, and a unique remedy: revocation of . 
the charter by the Board of Regents or charter entity based upon a PERB finding of a 
pattern and practice of unlawful discrimination or interference with charter school 
employee rights guaranteed by the Act. Like the definitions in Education Law 
§2854.3(a), this express grant of jurisdiction to PERB to decide improper employer 
practices is applicable to all charter schools. ' 
The collective bargaining, unit composition, employee representation, and 
employee organization access rights applicable to charter schools under the Charter 
Schools Act further demonstrate the Legislature's intent to grant us jurisdiction over 
Brooklyn Excelsior, Buffalo United and all other New York charter schools. Significantly, 
78
 Pub Auth Law §3629.2. 
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the charter agreements.for both schools incorporate those provisions from the Charter 
Schools Act. . 
Education Law §§2854.3(b) and (b-1) codify mandatory collective bargaining, unit 
composition and employee representation rights for charter school employees. 
Education Law §2854.3(b) states: 
The school employees of a charter school that has been 
converted from an existing public school who are eligible for 
representation under article fourteen of the civil service law 
shall be deemed to be included within the negotiating unit 
containing like titles or positions, if any, for the school district 
in which such charter school is located and shall be subject 
to the collective bargaining agreement covering that school 
district negotiating unit; provided, however, that a majority of 
the members of a negotiating unit within.a charter school 
may modify, in writing, a collective bargaining agreement for 
the purposes of employment in the charter school with the 
approval of the board of trustees of the charter school. 
(Emphasis added) 
Pursuantto Education Law §2854.3(b-1), under certain prescribed 
circumstances, the incumbent employee organization representing similar employees in 
the school district where the charter school is located is deemed to be the 
representative of a separate negotiation unit of similar employees working at the charter 
school under the Act.79 
The Legislature also mandated that charter schools permit reasonable access to 
their premises by uncertified and unrecognized employee organization representatives 
when seeking to represent unrepresented employees in a charter school.80 The use of 
the phrase "employee organization" in Education Law §2854.3(c-1)(i) reinforces, our 
conclusion that charter school employees are public employees covered by the Act. 
See, Niagara Charter Sch, 42 PERB P036 (2009). 
See, Educ Law §2854(c-1)(i). 
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The phrase "employee organization" is defined by the Act to mean "an organization of 
any kind having as its primary purpose the improvement of terms and conditions of 
employment of public employees."8^ (Emphasis added.) In addition, the Charter 
Schools Act arguably grants greater access rights to employee organizations seeking to 
represent unrepresented charter school employees than the rights we have recognized 
under the Act or that have been recognized under the NLRA.82 
The legislative choice to include provisions with respect to collective bargaining, 
unit composition, employee representation and employee organization access in the 
Education Law rather than the Act is not unique. Over the past few decades, the 
Legislature has chosen to define the scope of representation and negotiation rights of 
employees under the Act, in other statutes.83 When the Legislature created health care 
public benefits corporations under the Public Authorities Law and made them subject to 
the Act, it mandated varying requirements with respect to recognition of employee 
organizations, the composition of bargaining units, the continuation of existing terms ' 
81 Section 201.5 of the Act. 
82
 See, NYCTA, 3 PERB 1J3082 (1970); Charlotte Valley Cent Sch Dist, 18 PERB P010 
(1985); Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth, 28 PERB P080 at 3184 (1995), 
("employees have a right protected under the Act to discuss employment issues with 
other employees while on their employer's premises, so long as the communication is 
not disruptive to the performance of any work, at least in circumstances in which all 
speech of any kind while actively at work is not forbidden."); NLRB v-Babcock & Wilcox 
Co, 351 US 105 (1956); Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, 502 US 527 (1992) (limiting acces's 
rights on to employer property by non-employee representatives of a labor organization 
under the NLRA.) 
83
 See, Webster Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, supra, note 25 
(holding that Educ Law §1950 renders nonmandatory, a school district's unilateral 
decision to transfer unit work as part of a cooperative educational program.) 
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and conditions of employment, and the identity of the public employer for purposes of 
the Act.84 
Finally, we reject the joint public-private employer argument raised by NHA, 
Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United because it would lead to absurd results. First, it 
would mean that there is a trifurcated labor relations scheme in which an employer of a 
charter school is the education corporation under the Charter Schools Act, a joint public 
employer under §201.6(b) of the Act or a joint public-private employer under the • 
NLRA.85 Such trifurcation is inconsistent with the Legislature's intent to create a uniform 
system of labor relations for charter schools and it would create confusion and 
inconsistencies within that system. For example, the scope of bargaining, and the 
composition of units would differ depending on whether a charter school is subject to 
the Act or the NLRA.86 This may result in wide disparities in the manner in which public 
monies are expended at different schools. ' 
84
 Westchester County Health Care Corp Act, Pub Auth Law §§3304.2 and 4; Nassau 
Health Care Corp Act, Pub Auth Law §§3403.2, 3 and 4; Roswell Park Cancer Institute 
Corp Act, Pub Auth Law §§3557 and 3558; Clifton-Fine Health Care Corp Act, Pub Auth 
Law §3604; Erie County Medical Center Corp Act, Pub Auth Law §3629. 
85
 Under Brooklyn Excelsior, Buffalo United and NHA's argument, there could also be a 
fourth variant in the legal scheme for charter school labor relations. Arguably, if the . 
private entity that helped to form and helps to manage a charter school is not covered 
by the NLRA, it would be subject to the New York State Employment Relations Act 
(SERA), Labor Law §§700 etseq. Effective July 22, 2010, PERB was granted 
jurisdiction over SERA. L 2010, c 45, Part.O, §§1, 3 and 8. 
86
 For example, "issues such as class size, teacher evaluations, tenure standards, 
student contact, hours, and smoking prohibitions, when viewed through a private sector 
labor law lens, are straightforward working conditions and clearly mandatory subjects of 
bargaining." Martin H. Malin and Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and 
Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship? 30 Harv JL & 
Pub Poly 885, 931 (Summer 2007). In contrast, these topics are generally not 
mandatory subjects-under the Act. See, Cohoes City Sch Dist v Cohoes Teachers Assn, 
40 NY2d 774, 9 PERB fl7529 (1976) (tenure); West Irondequoit Teachers Assn v 
Helsby, 35 NY2d 46, 7 PERB U7014 (1974) (class size). 
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Adopting the joint public-private employer argument would also mean that 
employees at some, but not all, charter schools would be excluded from the Act's 
prohibition against strikes set forth in §210 of the Act. This would be the first time that 
teachers and other employees working in New York's public school system had a right 
to strike. We conclude that if the Legislature intended to make such a sharp volte-face 
in New York public policy, that intent would have been stated explicitly.87 
Uncertainty over whether employees at a particular charter school have a right to 
strike may compound the issues that parents and students consider in deciding whether 
to choose that school. Furthermore, administrators, employees and employee 
organizations will face similar dilemmas in determining which law applies with respect to 
possible strike activities at charter schools within a.school district. 
Based upon our conclusions that the Charter Schools Act supersedes our joint 
employer precedent, and that the Legislature intended PERB to have jurisdiction over 
all New York charter schools, we next determine whether assistant principals at 
Brooklyn Excelsior are managerial or confidential, and therefore not covered by the Act. 
C. Assistant Principals at Brooklyn Excelsior are Not Managerial or Confidential 
Pursuant to §201.7(a) of the Act, an employee may be designated as a 
managerial or confidential employee, and therefore excluded from coverage under the 
Act. A managerial designation is appropriate if the evidence establishes that the 
employee formulates policies, may reasonably be required to assist directly in the 
preparation and formulation of the employer's negotiation proposals or have a major 
role in the administration of an agreement or in personnel administration. An individual 
87
 Unlike the NLRB's conclusion in Charter School Administrative Services, Inc, 353 
NLRB No. 35, n 22 (2008), with respect to Michigan's charter school scheme, the 
Charter Schools Act creates a singular system of labor relations for New York charter. 
schools. 
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will be designated confidential only if he assists and acts in confidential capacity to a 
managerial employee under the Act.88 
As previously noted, Education Law §2854.1 states that the Charter Schools Act 
supersedes any other inconsistent Jaw, including the Act. With'.the exception of the 
chief executive officer designated by a charter school's Board of Trustees, all charter 
school employees are deemed public employees for purposes of the Act pursuant to 
Education Law §2854.3(a). 
The Charter Schools Act does not include a provision granting us authority to 
exclude charter school employees from the definition of public employee based upon a 
managerial or confidential designation pursuant to the standards set forth in §201.7(a) 
of the Act. This conclusion is based upon the wording of Education Law §2854.3(a), 
and our comparison of the Charter Schools Act with two 1997 laws, the Westchester 
County Medical Center Corporation Act and the Roswell Park Cancer Institute 
Corporation Act, creating public benefit corporations.89 When the Legislature created 
those entities, it explicitly stated that the representation and collective bargaining 
provisions in those laws shall not be construed to affect existing precedent regarding 
applications to PERB for managerial or confidential designations under the Act.90 > 
Similarly, the preservation of our authority over managerial and confidential 
designations for other newly created legal entities was included in statutes enacted after 
1998.91 The absence .of a similar provision in-the Charter Schools Act demonstrates 
88
 Town of Walworth] 43 PERB 1J3013 (2010). 
89
 Pub Auth Law §3300, et seq. and §3550, et seq. 
90
 Pub Auth Law §§3304.2(c) and 3558.3(c). 
91
 See, Pub Auth Law §§1147-h.2, 1949-g.2, 2350-X.3, 2642-J.2 and 3629.4. 
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that the Legislature intended to deprive us of jurisdiction to hear and determine 
applications seeking managerial and confidential designations of charter school 
employees under the Act.92 
In the alternative, we conclude that NHA and Brooklyn Excelsior have presented 
insufficient evidence in support of a managerial or confidential designation of the 
assistant principals under the Act. There is no evidence that the Brooklyn Excelsior 
Board of Trustees has appointed a chief executive officer pursuant to Education Law 
§2854.3(a) to perform the duties set forth in §§201.12 and 210 of the Act. Therefore, 
we are unable to ascertain the relationship between the assistant principals and that 
managerial position referenced in the Charter Schools Act. In addition, NHA and 
Brooklyn Excelsior have not demonstrated that the Board of Trustees has delegated 
any managerial or confidential duties to the assistant principals pursuant to Education 
Law §2853.1 (f) or has specifically approved the assignment of such duties by-NHA to 
the assistant principals consistent with the management agreement. 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ in Case E-2429, and dismiss the 
application filed by NHA and Brooklyn Excelsior to designate the assistant principals as 
managerial or confidential. 
Finally, we turn to the federal preemption argument asserted by NHA, Brooklyn 
Excelsior, and Buffalo United premised upon their claim that the NLRB has exclusive 
92
 See, Rosen v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 72 NY2d 42, 21 PERB1J7014 
(1988). Nevertheless, consistent with the community of interest standards set forth in 
§207.1 of the Act, we retain the authority to exclude individuals from a unit of rank and 
file charter school employees based upon an inherent conflict of interests. See, New 
York State Police, 1 PERB 1J399.32 (1968); State of New York, 5 PERB P001 (1972); 
Town ofRamapo, 40 PERB fl3016 (2007). In Case C-5672, we find no such conflict 
because the petitioned-for unit is comprised only of assistant principals, all of whom 
perform the same or similar duties at Brooklyn Excelsior. 
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jurisdiction over the two charter schools. Amici New York City Department of Education 
and the Atlantic Legal Foundation support the preemption argument, while the amici 
NYSUT, UFT, AFT and NEA contend that the. NLRA does not preempt us from 
rendering a decision on the questions of representation. 
D. The Charter Schools Act and Taylor Law Are Not Preempted by the NLRA 
Under the-federal preemption doctrine annunciated in San Diego Building Trades 
Council v Garmon,93 "[wjhen an activity is arguably subject to §7 or §8 of the [NLRA], 
the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the 
National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is 
to be averted." The purpose of Garmon preemption is to prevent a conflict between the 
NLRA's regulatory scheme and state and local regulation in the area of labor relations. 
Based upon our conclusion that Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United are clearly 
sole employers pursuant to the Charter Schools Act, we next determine whether each is 
a "political subdivision" of the State, as that phrase is utilized in §2.2 of the NLRA,94 and 
therefore exempt from NLRB jurisdiction.95 
In National Labor Relations Board v Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins 
County,96 the United States Supreme Court adopted the criteria applied by the NLRB for 
93
.359 US 236 (1959). . 
94
 29 USC §152.2. 
95
 In Mosaica Academy of Saginaw v. Michigan Educ Assn, 2002 WL 1375890, 15 
MPER *f|33062 (2002), the Michigan Court of Appeals vacated a decision by the 
Michigan Employment Relations Commission directing an election at a Michigan charter 
school, and deferred the question of preemption to the NLRB. In the present cases, we 
are determining the preemption issue at the request of the parties based upon our 
conclusion that it is clear that NHA is not the employer or a component of a joint 
employer at either charter school. 
402 US 600 (1971). 
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determining when an entity is a political subdivision under §2.2 of the NLRA. Under 
those criteria, an entity is exempt from NLRB jurisdiction if it is "either (1) created 
directly by the State, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of the 
government, or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or 
to the general electorate."97 
We are mindful that political subdivision status under the NLRA is not identical to 
public employer status under the Taylor Law or the Charter Schools Act.98 Similarly, we 
reject NHA, Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United's argument that the definition of a 
"political subdivision" under New York Constitution, Article V, §1 is determinative of 
whether an entity is a "political subdivision" under §2.2 of the NLRA.99 Although the 
NLRA and New York Constitution, Article V, §1 utilize the same phrase, the latter, was 
adopted in 1925 for the purpose of establishing constitutional parameters of the New; 
York Comptroller's authority. As Garmon demonstrates, the definition of a "political 
subdivision" under §2.2 of NLRA has a special and distinct meaning under the 
standards developed by the NLRB. 
y /
 Supra, note 96, 402 US at 604-05. 
98
 New York Institute for the Blind v UFT, 83 AD2d 390, 398,15 PERB 1J7502 at 7506, 
(1st Dept 1981), a/fd 57 NY2d 982 (1982). 
99
 See, New York Charter Sch Assn v DiNapoli, supra, note 30 (holding that a 2005 
amendment to the Charter Schools Act granting the Comptroller the authority to audit 
charter schools was unconstitutional because a charter school is not a "political 
subdivision" of New York as that phrase is utilized in New York Constitution, Article V, 
§1 with respect to the Comptroller's constitutional powers, and that such auditing is not 
incidental to the Comptroller's constitutional power to audit a public school district). See 
also, New York Charter Sch Assn v Smith, supra, note 6 (holding that a charter school 
does not constitute a "public entity" under New York's prevailing wage law, Labor Law 
§220); Caviness v Horizon Comm Learning Ctr, Inc., 590 F3d 806 (9th Cir 2010) (a 
state definition of a charter school as a public school does not demonstrate that it is a 
.state actor for purposes of 42 USC §1983). 
uase INOS. u-oo/z, t-z4zy & u-ots/s -4 1-
In determining whether an entity is a political subdivision under §2.2 of the NLRA, 
the NLRB considers the state enabling legislation, the statutory scheme, and the 
legislative intent to be important factors.100 The NLRB decides whether an entity is a 
political subdivision on a case-by-case basis. Because state charter school legislation 
across the country is not uniform, decisions by the NLRB and its Regional Directors 
regarding charter schools in other States are relevant only insofar as they are illustrative 
of how preemption standards apply to different state charter school schemes.101 
Under the charter school system in New York, Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo 
United were created as the direct result of enabling actions by two State entities, the 
Board of Regents and the SUNY Trustees. Without those enabling actions neither 
charter school would exist. Both charter schools entered into charter agreements with 
the SUNY Trustees, which mandate that the schools operate consistent with the 
provisions of the Charter Schools Act, The charter agreements refer to the applicable 
labor relations provisions of the Charter Schools Act regarding unit composition, 
collective bargaining, employee representation and employee organization access..
 t., 
100
 See, New York Institute for the Blind, 254 NLRB 664 (1981); University of Vermont, 
297 NLRB 291 (1989); Hinds County Human Resource Agency, 331 NLRB 1404 
(2000); Research Foundation of the City University of New York, 337 NLRB 965 (2002). 
101
 See, Charter School Administrative Services, Inc, supra, note 87 (holding that a 
private for-profit corporation that manages a charter school pursuant to a contract is not 
a political subdivision under §2.2 of the Act.) In Chicago Mathematics & Science 
Academy Charter School Inc., supra,, note 6 and in Los Angeles Leadership Academy, 
Case 31-RM-1281 (2006), two NLRB Regional Directors concluded that the NLRA did 
not preempt state labor relations regulation of charter schools in Illinois and California 
respectively. The significance of the preemption issue as it relates to the state created, 
supervised and funded public charter school in Chicago Mathematics & Science 
Academy Charter School, Inc. has led the NLRB to issue a notice dated January 10, 
2011, soliciting amici briefs as part of its review of the NLRB Region 13 Director's 
decision. The NLRB notice soliciting briefs is available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/about us/news room/Invitations/Documents/Chicago Mathematics 
Brief.pdf 
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Prior to approval of a charter application, the Charter Schools Act mandates that a 
public hearing be conducted by school district officials or the Board of Regents to solicit 
comments from community residents. 
Both schools were incorporated as education corporations by the Board of 
Regents to operate independent and autonomous public schools within New York's 
public school system with powers that "constitute the performance of essential public 
purposes and governmental purposes of the state."102 Members of the initial Board of 
Trustees for each school were approved by the SUNY Trustees and were designated by 
the Board of Regents upon issuance of the charter. Charter schools are funded with 
State monies received directly from the school districts where they are located. By 
definition, charter schools are public employers for purposes of the Act: 
It is equally clear from the Charter Schools Act that the Legislature intended the 
administration of Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United, through their respective Boards 
of Trustees, to be accountable to the public and State officials including the Board of 
Regents, the SUNY Trustees, the Commissioner of Education and PERB.
 s 
The Board of Regents and SUNY Trustees have regulatory responsibilities over 
the schools' public funding, including fiscal monitoring and auditing of the schools. 
.Each charter school is obligated to file an annual report with the applicable charter entity 
and the Board of Regents delineating expenditures for employee salaries and benefits. 
In addition, by requiring public hearings regarding the approval and renewal of all 
charters, the Legislature has mandated that charter schools be accountable to the , 
public, as well. 
Educ Law §2853.1(d). 
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Education Law §2854.3(c-2) grants PERB regulatory responsibilities over charter 
schools by granting it jurisdiction to hear and determine improper practice charges 
alleging that a. charter school, its Board of Trustees and other agents have violated 
§§209-a. 1 (a) and (c) of the Act. 
As part of the Charter Schools Act's regulatory scheme, the Board of Regents 
and SUNY Trustees supervise and oversee both schools, including inspecting the 
schools and their records to ensure that they are complying with all applicable laws, 
regulations and charter provisions. In addition, the school districts where Brooklyn 
Excelsior and Buffalo United are located have the power to visit, examine and inspect 
the school and its records to ensure compliance with all applicable laws, regulations and 
charter provisions. Among the supervisory powers of the Board of Regents and the 
SUNY Trustees is the power to revoke a charter at any time based upon any of four 
statutory reasons, including serious violations of law or a finding by PERB that the 
school has engaged in a pattern and practice of violating §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the 
Act. Although the phrase "serious violations of law" is undefined, it can reasonably be 
construed to include violations of the rights of collective bargaining, unit composition, 
employee representation, and employee organization access guaranteed by the Charter 
Schools Act. In addition, all charter schools are obligated to meet the same health and 
safety, civil rights, and student assessment requirements applicable to other public 
schools. 
The supervisory and oversight responsibilities of.the Board of Regents, the • 
SUNY Trustees and the Commissioner of Education also include the power to 
investigate and remedy complaints that challenge the management and operation of 
either school. The Board of Regents and the SUNY Trustees have the power to 
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disapprove renewal of the Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo United charters.103 . 
Revocation or nonrenewal of a charter would result in the abolition of the education 
corporation established by the Board of Regents when it issued the charter, and has the 
effect of terminating the charter school's Board of Trustees. In addition, charter school 
trustees and employees can be removed from office or terminated for violating the 
ethical prohibitions set forth in New York's General Municipal Law. 
Finally, charter school employees may participate in New York's teachers' 
retirement system and other retirement systems open to public school employees.104 
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo 
United are political subdivisions pursuant to §2.2 of the NLRA and, therefore we are not 
preempted from determining the questions of representation presented in Cases 
C-5672 and C-5878. 
J . We recognize, of course, that the NLRB and the federal courts have ultimate 
authority over issues of preemption. However, a contrary legal determination by the 
NLRB and the courts might call into question the constitutionality of numerous 
. provisions of the Charter Schools Act as applied to the two at-issue charter schools, 
including: a) the collective bargaining, unit composition, employee representation, 
employee organization access rights and improper practice provisions in Education Law 
103
 Educ Law §2855. 
104
 Educ Law §2854.3(c). The assertion that NHA, Brooklyn Excelsior and Buffalo 
United have discretion under the Charter Schools Act to determine whether employees 
can participate in a public retirement system is undermined by their preemption 
argument. If New York is preempted from legislating a labor relations regime for the two 
charter schools, the retirement provisions in the Charter Schools Act would be equally 
preempted because retirement benefits are a mandatory subject of negotiations under 
x the NLRA. Inland Steel Co, 77 NLRB 1 (1948), enforced, Inland Steel Co v NLRB, 170 
J F2d 247 (7th Cir 1948), cert den 336 US 960 (1949). 
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§2854; b) the supervisory and charter revocation powers of the Board of Regents and 
the SUNY Trustees in Education Law §2855; and c) the statutory ethical prohibitions 
applicable to charter school trustees and employees that can form the basis for their 
removal or termination. In addition, related provisions in the charter agreements for 
both schools in the present cases may be found to be preempted. Therefore, the 
assertion of federal jurisdiction over the representation questions in these cases may 
undermine the constitutional legitimacy of New York's system of charter schools, and 
destabilize the legal status and the very existence of both charter schools at-issue in the 
present cases unless there is a judicial determination that the Charter Schools Act is 
severable. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the ALJ's 
decision in Cases C-5672 and E-2429. We remand Case C-5672 to the ALJ to 
ascertain the sufficiency of majority support for the Council,^and dismiss the application 
by NHA and Brooklyn Excelsior to designate the assistant principals as managerial or 
confidential under the Act. In Case C-5878, we reverse the ALJ and remand the case 
to ascertain the sufficiency of majority support for the Association. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition in Case E-2429 is dismissed, 
and Cases C-5672 and C-5878 are remanded for further processing consistent with this 
decision. 
DATED: February 14, 2011 
Albany, New York D ^r^~ 
~7J Jerome Lefkowife, Chapman 
s Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS UNION, COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5976 
CORNING COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Employer. 
BILL LeBEAU, for Petitioner 
SAYLES & EVANS (JAMES F. YOUNG of Counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 11, 2010, the New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, Council 
82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of 
the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
r - _ 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the Corning Community College 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All full-time and part-time college security guards. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on December 22, 
2010, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 14, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
Sheila S. Cole, Ivlember 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, 
Petitioner, 
- a n d - CASE NO. C-5980 
TOWN OF TICONDEROGA, 
Employer, 
- and -' 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE 
OFFICERS, INC., 
Intervenor/lncumbent. ' 
BRUCE BRAMLEY, ESQ., for Petitioner -
MICHAEL A. RICHARDSON, for Employer 
ALBERT J. PIRRO, JR., ESQ., for Intervenor/lncumbent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 25, 2010, the Teamsters Local 294 (petitioner) filed, in accordance with 
the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition 
seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain employees of the Town 
of Ticonderoga (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: ' All full-time and part-time Police Officers and Sergeants. • 
Excluded: The Chief of Police and all other employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on December 29, 
2010, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed.
 N 
DATED: February 14, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 1922, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CU-6020 
ONTIMEAMBULETTE, 
Employer. 
PATRICK J. McCABE, for Petitioner 
MARTIN GRINGER, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On October 18, 2010, Local 1922, International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the State Employment Relations 
Act, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain 
employees of On Time Ambulette (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they .stipulated 
i 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: Drivers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on December'30, 
2010, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
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voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 14, 2011 
Albany, New York 
— < 
// Jerome Lefkowitz/Chairm 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POLICE ASSOCIATION OF NEW ROCHELLE, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE, CASE NO. U-26722 
Respondent, 
- and -
NEW ROCHELLE SUPERIOR OFFICERS' 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. • • - . . . 
THOMAS J. TROETTI, ESQ., for Charging Party 
LAW OFFICE OF VINCENT TOOMEY (CHRISTINE A. GAETA of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BUNYAN & BAUMGARTNER LLP (RICHARD P. BUNYAN of counsel), for 
Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
• This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the City of New Rochelle 
(City) and the New Rochelle Superior Officers' Association (SOA) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge filed by the Police 
•Association of New Rochelle (PBA). The charge alleged that the City violated §209-a.1 
(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, on January 1, 2006, the 
City's Police Department (Department) assigned nonunit superior officers to work 
special-duty details (SDD) previously performed exclusively by PBA unit employees. 
The City filed exceptions asserting that: the ALJ erred in finding that we have 
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subject matter jurisdiction over the charge, the ALJ made evidentiary findings that were 
internally inconsistent, the evidence does not support the ALJ's finding that SDD work 
had been performed exclusively by PBA unit employees for a sufficient period of time to 
become a binding past practice, and the management rights clause in the collective 
bargaining agreement reserves to the City the right to decide whether to distribute such 
work to non-PBA unit employees. 
The City also excepts to the ALJ's proposed remedy requiring that PBA unit 
employees be made whole for any loss of wages and benefits suffered by reason of the 
transfer'of the work to nonunit employees. It argues that such a remedy is 
unreasonable because it would require the City to reimburse PBA unit employees for 
work that they did not perform. 
SOA asserts in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in determining that this Board 
has subject matter jurisdiction, and in finding that the at-issue work had been performed 
exclusively by PBA unit employees. 
FACTS 
The City provides in-uniform security protection and other services, known as 
SDD, for merchants, vendors, and contractors, among others. These services are 
performed by off-duty police officers on avoluntary basis. 
The only witness to testify at the hearing was PBA President Ed Hayes, who was 
originally appointed as a City police officer on November 4, 1990. He testified that PBA 
members have performed SDD assignments since before he began his service as a 
City police officer. Such assignments were first sought by City merchants and vendors, 
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and they were subsequently requested by other entrepreneurs and by one resident. 
The services include directing traffic, providing security and a police presence. While 
performing off-duty assignments, the police officers are dressed in uniform and carry 
their service revolver. They were compensated directly by the business or person who 
sought the particular service. 
Originally, SOA members, too, received such assignments but they were phased 
out by the merchants and vendors over a period of time. By 2000, only SOA members 
performed SDD when the number of PBA officers working a detail was sufficient to 
necessitate supervision. 
The City was fully aware that PBA unit members were performing these off-duty 
assignments. In fact, the practice was expressly sanctioned by the City Police 
Commissioner and, sometimes, the assignments were announced and distributed at 
roll-call. In other situations, a sergeant would supervise the meetings at which PBA 
members volunteered for the off-duty details to make sure that all the details were 
covered. There were various techniques utilized to resolve bidding disputes over the 
off-duty assignments, including the selection of coins that had numbers on the bottom 
side or by drawing a piece of paper with relevant information written on it. 
• In mid-March of 2002, the City Police Commissioner revoked his permission for 
PBA members to work SDD. PBA filed an improper practice charge against the City. 
Pending the outcome of the charge, in April 2002 the City consented to PBA unit 
members continuing to perform SDD. Negotiations to reach a settlement on the 
improper practice charge proceeded at a desultory pace. A final settlement was 
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reached and signed by PBA and the City on August 6, 2004. In pertinent part, it reads 
as follows: 
WHEREAS, the Police Commissioner of the city (sic) of New 
Rochelle ("Police Commissioner") has establishes (sic) voluntary 
paid police details where members work at certain locations and 
occasions in New Rochelle when a merchant/vendor contacts with 
and pays the City such special police services (the "Special-Duty 
Details"); and 
WHEREAS, these Special-Duty Details have heretofore been 
compensated directly by the merchant/vendor or other individual or 
entity requesting the special police service of those Police; and 
WHEREAS, in March 2002 the Police Commissioner suspended 
these Special-Duty Details; 
WHEREAS, the Association filed an improper practice against the 
City; and 
WHEREAS, the City and Association wish to resolve that litigation 
and enter into an agreement governing Special-Duty Details within 
the City;... 
NOW, THEREFORE, the City and the Association agree to the 
following terms: 
1. All members of the Association, consisting of Police 
Officers and Detectives, shall be eligible to work the , 
Special-Duty Details. Assignment to the Special Duty 
Details shall be made by the Police Commissioner or his 
designated representative who shall distribute such 
assignments as equitably as possible in accordance with 
paragraph number two (2) of this stipulation. All such 
assignments shall be on a voluntary basis except as 
otherwise noted herein. A written list of the initial jobs ' 
participating in the Special-Duty Detail Program shall be 
provided to the Association upon the signing of this 
agreement. 
The. agreement also provided for SDD to be selected on the basis of seniority 
except for last minute requests for details, in which case they would be filled from a 
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rotational list which, among other things, was to be updated by removal of officers who 
were promoted out of the PBA unit. 
By agreement between the City and the PBA, the new procedure annunciated by 
the stipulation was to take effect on January 1, 2005. This enabled the City to notify the 
vendors, etc. of the new procedure, including the higher rate.to be charged by the City, 
how the vendors should pay the City and it afforded the vendors an opportunity to 
decide whether they wanted to participate in the program. 
For the remainder of 2004, unit members continued to use the pre-existing 
bidding system for the special details and were paid directly by the merchants/vendors. 
They also continued to perform SDD duties exclusively, although, as before, superior 
. officers were assigned when the number of PBA unit members on a specific detail was 
sufficient to require supervision. 
In 2005, there were between 1,500 and 2,000 non-supervisory SDD, all 
performed by PBA members, and all assigned and compensated by the City. 
On January 19', 2006, the City and SOA entered into an agreement making 
members of SOA eligible for SDD upon designation by the Police Commissioner. The 
agreement closely follows the PBA/City stipulation and even provides that the 
compensation to be paid to SOA members would be the same as that paid to PBA unit 
members who perform SDD. PBA President Hayes learned of the SOA/City agreement 
shortly after it was entered into and PBA filed the charge herein. In pertinent part, it 
states: "On or about January 1, 2006, the City began making available to members of 
the SOA on a voluntary basis the Special-Duty Detail known as '1 i Hillendale Drive' 
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which had exclusively been performed by members of PBA." 
DISCUSSION 
PERB Jurisdiction 
The exceptions by the City and SOA argue that the stipulation settling the earlier 
charge deprives PERB of jurisdiction over the charge because §205.5(d) of the Act 
provides that: "the board shall not have authority to enforce an agreement between an 
employer and an employee organization and shall not exercise jurisdiction over an 
alleged violation of such an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an improper 
employer or employee organization practice." 
In County of Nassau? we wrote that "unless the agreement is a reasonably 
arguable source of right to the charging party with respect to the same subject matter 
as the improper practice charge, no contract violation may be established, and our ^ 
jurisdiction is clear." The ALJ found that the settlement agreement did not grant PBA 
unit members the right to exclusively perform SDD, but made them eligible for such 
work and set forth the terms and conditions applicable to performance of that work.2 
We affirm this finding by the ALJ. 
The City's brief expressly acknowledges that the stipulation is not a source of 
f 
right of exclusivity to PBA. It argues, however, that the County of Nassau decision 
states that if an agreement is a source of right to the employer, an issue of a waiver of 
the right to negotiate is presented, which is subject to PERB's jurisdiction. We reject 
1
 23 PERB 1J3051 at p. 3108 (1990). 
2
 See, 42 PERB 1J4578 at p. 4816 (2009). 
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the City's argument because the issue of waiver concerns the merits of the charge, not 
jurisdiction. 
The City also asserts that because PBA President Hayes testified that he thought 
that the City's conduct constituted a violation of the stipulation, PERB lacks jurisdiction. 
We reject this proposition. While the testimony given by Hayes regarding the facts that 
form the basis for the alleged enforceable past practice is relevant, his opinion about 
the meaning or violation of the stipulation is not. 
Waiver and Duty Satisfaction Defenses 
An essential element of a charge alleging a unilateral change that violates §209-
a.1(d) of the Act is that the subject matter,of the change is mandatorily negotiable. The 
the Appellate Division, Third Department articulated the applicable standard for 
determining whether an employee organization waived its right to negotiate a subject: 
A waiver is 'the intentional relinquishment of a known right 
with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to 
relinquish it. . .' Such a waiver must be clear, unmistakable 
and without ambiguity.3 (Citation omitted.) 
We find no record evidence to support a conclusion that PBA has waived its right 
to negotiate the subject matter of the charge. Although the management rights clause 
gives the City the sole right to direct its employees and "to determine the methods, 
, means and number of personnel by which its operations are to be conducted," this • 
provision does not constitute a'waiver by PBA of its right to negotiate a unilateral 
3
 CSEAv Newman, 88 AD2d 685, 686, 15 PERB 1J70T1 at pp. 7021-7022 (1982), app 
dismissed 57 NY2d 775, 15 PERB fl 7020 (1982), affd 61 NY2d 1001, 17 PERB H7007 
(1984) (subsequent history omitted); see also, County of Columbia, 41 PERB P023 
(2008). 
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change by reassigning exclusive bargaining unit work to nonunit employees. Neither 
does the language in the management rights clause reserving to the City the right "to 
maintain the efficiency of its operations [and] to determine the methods, means and 
number of personal by which its operations are to be conducted" satisfy its duty to 
negotiate a right to unilaterally reassign exclusive PBA unit work to nonunit employees. 
Similarly, the terms of the stipulation settling the prior improper practice charge do not 
constitute a clear, unmistakable and unambiguous waiver of the right to negotiate the 
subject matter or satisfy the City's duty to bargain the transfer of unit work. 
Evaluation of the Evidence and Related Legal Conclusions 
Hayes's unrebutted testimony establishes that PBA unit employees, and only 
PBA unit employees had performed the SDD assignments exclusively for at least five 
years prior to January 1, 2005. The only exception involved the supervision of PBA unit 
employees by SOA unit supervisors when such supervision was required. 
The City's approval of the off-duty SDD work by PBA unit members before 2005 
arguably did not make the City the employer of those employees for the at-issue work. 
During that period, the vendors and merchants utilizing the services determined the 
work to be done, and they selected PBA unit employees to do it exclusively because 
they determined that those police officers would provide the service they sought, a 
police presence, less expensively than superior officers. And they paid the PBA unit 
employees directly. The City's role was limited to permitting those employees to 
perform that off-duty work for hire. 
"Under the Taylor Law, an employer's restriction on the use of nonworking time 
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by employees is a term and condition of employment and, in general, constitutes a 
mandatory subject of negotiations."4 
Effective January 1, 2005, the City assumed responsibility for providing those off-
duty services to the merchants and vendors5 that it had previously permitted PBA unit 
members to provide on their own. It also assumed the responsibility for remunerating 
• those police officers who volunteer to perform SDD. At that time, the City became the 
employer of PBA unit employees for the off-duty work at-issue in this case. The record 
shows that thereafter PBA unit employees exclusively performed the work, and that this 
exclusivity continued for twelve months. 
In Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority,6 we wrote that an essential element 
in determining whether the reassignment of unit work is mandatorily negotiable is that 
.the work had been performed by them "exclusively for a sufficient period of time to have 
become binding . . . ." However, we have never annunciated a minimum period of time 
required to establish exclusivity. This is because the sufficiency of the duration 
depends upon the circumstance of each particular fact pattern. For example, the fact 
that an employer paid for a Christmas party for its employees in two consecutive years, 
without any additional facts and circumstances, would be insufficient to establish a 
binding past practice under the Act. On the other hand, we affirmed an ALJ's finding 
4
 NYCTA, 42 PERB 3012 (2009), confd, NYCTA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 
78 AD2d 1185, 44 PERB 1J7001 (2d Dept 2010). 
5
 "A public employer is no less a public employer because it may provide a 'private' 
service." Dutchess Comm Coll, 17 PERB fl3010 at p. 3023 (1984). 
618PERBP085(1985). ' 
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that 13 months was sufficient to establish a binding past-practice of police officers 
controlling traffic at one particular construction site.7 In addition, the performance of 
fleet manager duties for 11 1/4 months was found by an ALJ to be sufficient for that work 
to constitute exclusive work for a bargaining unit.8 
The uncontested testimony in this case is that in 2005, between 1,500 and 2,000 
SDD were performed exclusively by PBA unit employees on behalf of the City, and they 
were paid at their overtime rate. This practice followed the related prior practice of PBA 
unit members performing the same assignments directly for a vendor or merchant. We 
conclude that under these facts and circumstances, the one year period of exclusivity of 
performing SDD on behalf of the City was sufficient to have become binding. 
The Remedy -
" The City excepts to the remedy fashioned by the ALJ insofar as she ordered it to 
"[m]ake whole employees in the unit represented by the Association who were affected by 
the transfer of special-duty detail work for any loss of wages and benefits suffered by 
reason of the transfer of that work, with interest at the maximum legal rate . . ." It argues 
that "no PBA member suffered any loss of wages or benefits since (1) they worked as 
much overtime as they were permitted to and/or (2) they did not work the Special Duty 
Details and are thus not entitled to payment for services not rendered. The ALJ's remedy 
is, therefore, unreasonable, and should be reversed." 
7
 City of Rochester, 21 PERB 1J3040 (1988), confirmed sub nom. City of Rochester v 
PERB, 155 AD2d 1003, 22 PERB 1J7035 (4th Dept 1989). 
8
 County of Onondaga and Sheriff of the County of Onondaga, 29 PERB ft4541 (1995) 
affirmed on other grounds, 29 PERB P046 (1996). 
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We reject these arguments. To the extent that the City's first argument is correct, 
the make whole remedy is irrelevant. If, however, identifiable unit employees would 
have been eligible for SDD but were denied that opportunity because such work was 
assigned to SOA unit employees, they are entitled to be made whole under the Act. 
Our practice is to address factual issues regarding the application of a remedial order to 
particular individuals during a compliance proceeding following judicial enforcement of a 
PERB remedial order pursuant to §213(a) of the Act.9 To permit parties to present 
evidence regarding an appropriate remedy before the Board has finally determined that 
there has been a violation of the Act would unnecessarily prolong the length and cost of 
hearings. Furthermore, we have found that in an overwhelming majority of our cases, 
the parties are able to resolve remedial issues following a final order finding a violation 
of the Act. 
CONCLUSION . 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the ALJ and conclude that 
the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally transferred exclusive PBA 
unit SDD work to SOA unit employees.10 
9
 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 42 PERB ff3016 (2009). 
10
 By reason of a typographical error or a mistake, the concluding paragraph of the 
•ALJ's decision and the first paragraph of the proposed remedial order, state that the 
past practice began "before January 1, 2005" and "prior to 2005". We have modified 
the remedial order to state "commencing January 1, 2005." 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City: 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally transferring to nonunit employees special-
duty detail work performed exclusively by employees in the unit, represented 
by PBA for the City commencing January 1, 2005; • 
2. Forthwith restore all special-duty detail work, excluding special-duty detail 
work that requires the performance of supervisory duties, to employees in the 
unit represented by PBA; 
3. Make whole employees in the unit represented by PBA who were affected by 
the transfer of special-duty detail work for any loss of wages and benefits 
suffered by reason of the transfer of that work, with interest at the maximum 
legalrate; and 
4. Sign and conspicuously post the attached notice at all physical and electronic 
locations throughout the City customarily used to communicate information to 
employees in the unit represented by PBA. 
DATED: February 14, 2011 
Albany, New York 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and- in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
We hereby notify all employees of the City of New Rochelle in the unit represented by 
Police Association of New Rochelle (PBA) that the City will: 
1. Not unilaterally transfer to nonunit employees special-duty detail work that 
was performed exclusively by employees in the unit represented by PBA for 
the City commencing January 1, 2005; 
2. Forthwith restore, all special-duty detail work, excluding special-duty detail 
work that requires the performance of supervisory duties, to employees in 
the unit represented by PBA; and 
3. Make whole employees in the unit represented by PBA who were affected 
by the transfer of special-duty detail work for any loss of wages and 
benefits suffered by reason of the transfer of that work, with interest at the 
maximum legal rate. 
Dated By . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
on behalf of the CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, • 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 891, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-28706 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
SPIVAK LIPTON LLP (NEIL D. LIPTON of counsel), for Charging Party 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (SETH J. BLAU of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City of New York (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge filed by Local 891, 
International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (Local 891 ).1 Local 891 alleges 
that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally modified a past practice by reducing the number of annual 
parking permits issued to Local 891-represented unit members, and by changing the 
1
 In Bd ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 42 PERB 1J3037 (2009), we 
granted the District's motion, pursuant to §213.4 of PERB's Rules of Procedure, to 
extend its. time to file exceptions to the ALJ's decision. 
method of distribution of the permits. The District filed an answer denying the material 
allegations of the charge and asserting various affirmative defenses. 
Following a hearing, the ALJ concluded that the District's actions constituted a 
unilateral change to a past practice with respect to a mandatory subject in violation of 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act.2 The ALJ ordered the District to make whole Local 891-
represented unit employees for wages and benefits lost as a result of the change in 
practice, and to restore the practice of providing parking permits upon request. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District argues that the issuance of parking permits, without the guarantee of 
an available parking space, is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. It asserts that the 
ALJ erred in finding that the District unilaterally reduced the number of parking permits 
to be issued and changed the method of distribution. The District also contends that the 
ALJ's decision violates public policy because it is contrary to the authority granted to the 
New York City Department of Transportation (DOT) to regulate parking on New York 
City (City) streets. Furthermore, it asserts that the ALJ's proposed remedial order 
cannot be complied with because of a City initiative intended to establish disincentives 
for commuting by car. Finally, although the ALJ did not find that the District refused to 
negotiate impact, the District argues that the charge should have been dismissed based 
upon Local 891's failure to demand that form of bargaining. 
Local 891 supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
2
 42 PERB U4568(2009). 
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FACTS 
Local 891 is the exclusive bargaining representative for Custodian Engineers 
employed by the District. Approximately 950 Custodian Engineers are responsible for 
maintaining over 1,100 District school buildings and school grounds, opening the school 
buildings in the mornings, plowing and removing ice and snow during winter months, 
purchasing and picking up supplies, and driving to a central District location to pick up 
paycheck stubs. Generally, a Custodian Engineer is assigned to work at one school 
building, but in certain situations, he or she may be responsible for more than one 
school building. In such cases, Custodian Engineers are required to visit each assigned 
school building at least once per day. Necessarily, Custodian Engineers frequently 
drive their own private vehicles in completing their job duties. 
At all relevant times, DOT has designated 10,007 on-street parking spaces for 
use by District employees, including Custodian Engineers. The District has designated 
an additional 15,060 parking spaces on school grounds for District employee use. All of 
the designated on-street and off-street parking spaces are clearly marked by DOT signs 
that read, essentially, no parking on school days from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., except for 
District parking permit holders. , 
Charles Stamm (Stamm), Director of Special Projects for the District's Office of 
the Deputy Chancellor, testified that, in the 2007-2008 school year, the District issued 
and distributed, approximately 63,000 parking permits, which allowed District employees 
to park in the DOT-designated on-street parking spaces'or the District's off-street 
parking spaces on a first-come, first-served basis. 
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Four Custodian Engineers, each employed by the District for more than thirteen 
years, testified that in each year prior to 2009, they requested and received parking 
permits for use of the on-street and off-street parking spaces designated for District 
employees. One Custodian Engineer testified that having a parking permit made it 
easier to park near his assigned school building. 
In January 2008, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg (Bloomberg) 
announced a City-wide initiative to reduce the total number of parking permits issued by 
twenty percent. The initiative was aimed at relieving traffic congestion and reducing the 
size of the City's carbon footprint by encouraging the use of public transportation and 
discouraging abuse of parking permits. In furtherance of the initiative, Bloomberg 
directed that only DOT and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) would be 
authorized to issue parking permits for the on-street parking spaces. The District was 
no longer authorized to issue parking permits for the on-street parking spaces. 
In a letter dated August 26, 2008, from Edward Skyler (Skyler), Deputy Mayor for 
Operations of the Office of the Mayor of the City of New York, to Randi Weingarten 
(Weingarten), then President of the United Federation of Teachers (LIFT), Skyler 
announced that DOT would produce, and the District would issue, exactly 10,007 on--
street parking permits.' Skyler announced that the District would continue to produce 
and issue permits only for the 15,060 off-street parking spaces, as it had done in the 
past. In addition, DOT would produce, and the District would issue, 1,000 additional 
parking permits for distribution to and use by teachers and other staff who traveled 
frequently from school to school. These additional parking permits would allow parking 
City-wide for three hours at a time. 
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Regarding the method of distributing permits, Skyler stated that school principals 
and UFT chapter leaders would decide on the distribution of parking permits either by 
assigning the permits to individual staff, pooling the permits for general use, or by 
combining individual assignment and pooling. At the hearing, Stamm testified that there 
was a default method of distribution by which the principal would receive one parking 
permit and the remaining parking permits would be shared by all school staff, including 
Custodian Engineers. Stamm testified that the new distribution method applied to 
parking permits for, both on-street and off-street parking spaces. 
Matthew Wile, Local 891 Vice President and a District Custodian Engineer, 
testified that following the District's implementation of the City-wide initiative, a majority 
of Custodian Engineers did not receive parking permits for 2009. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with the District's argument that the provision of parking permits is not 
a mandatory subject of negotiation because the possession of a parking permit does not 
guarantee the availability of a parking space. 
It is well-established that free parking is a mandatory subject of negotiation 
because it is an economic benefit to the employees.3 In this case, the possession of a 
parking permit is a condition precedent, controlled by the District, which enables 
Custodian Engineers to park for free in on-street and off-street parking near the school 
buildings where they work. A parking space is not guaranteed to all permit-holding 
employees any more than is the right of a job applicant to be hired to fill a vacant 
3
 County of Nassau (Dept of Drug and Alcohol Addiction), 14 PERB Tf3083, at 3144 
(1981), confd, County of Nassau v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 15 PERB ^7002 
(Nassau County Sup Ct 1982), affd, 87 AD2d 1006, 15 PERB fl7025 (2d Dept 1982). 
position. Despite this, the Board has held that posting and bidding procedures for 
vacant positions are mandatorily negotiable.4 This rationale is also applicable to 
procedures for parking permits. The granting of a permit is a procedure that enables an 
employee access to free parking, and is an economic benefit that is mandatorily 
negotiable. Therefore, we deny the District's exception. 
We next turn to the District's exception to the ALJ's finding that the District 
unilaterally reduced the number of parking permits issued and changed the method of 
distribution of parking permits to Custodian Engineers. The District does not dispute the 
ALJ's finding that a past practice existed whereby the Custodian Engineers received 
parking permits upon request, which allowed them to park in either on-street or off-
street parking spaces on a first-come, first-served basis. Nor does the District dispute 
that the practice continued uninterrupted and without exception until the implementation 
of the City's parking permit initiative. The District contends that Local 891 failed to 
demonstrate that the District was responsible for the change in the practice. It asserts 
that it did not violate the Act because it had no role in implementing the City's parking 
permit initiative as evidenced by the fact that the District was not a party to the Skyler 
letter. , 
In County of Schenectady and Sheriff,5 the Board held that an employer violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act when the number of parking spaces available for unit employee 
use was reduced, and the employer imposed its proposed remedy for the reduced 
4
 Niagara Falls Police Captains and Lieutenants Assn, 33 PERB *p058 (2000); 
Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn, 21 PERB P022 (1988); Dutchess County 
BOCES Faculty Assn, 17 PERB 1J3120 (1984), confd Dutchess County BOCES v 
Newman, 122 AD2d 845, 19 PERB 1J7018 (2d Dept 1986). 
518PERBP038(1985). 
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number of spaces on unit employees without including the employee organization that 
represented that unit in the discussions of the remedy, as it had with other employee 
organizations representing employees in other units who utilized the same parking lot. 
Contrary to the District's argument that it was not responsible for implementing 
the change in practice, there is no evidence in the record that the District was ordered 
by the City or DOT to discontinue issuing permits for on-street or off-street parking 
spaces to Local 891 unit employees. The fact that the District received a copy of 
Skyler's letter to Weingarten does not constitute proof that the District's unilateral 
actions were mandated by the City. Furthermore, the City's apparent direct discussion 
with the UFT about the parking permit issues does not excuse the District's continuing 
obligation to negotiate with Local 891 under the Act. 
The evidence establishes that the District unilaterally reduced the number of 
parking permits issued to Custodian Engineers. Prior to 2009, most Custodian 
Engineers received parking permits from the District upon request for on-street and off-
street parking. Starting in January 2009, most Custodian Engineers did not receive 
parking permits even though the District was authorized, under the City's initiative, to 
issue 1,000 additional parking permits for staff whose work required frequent travel from 
school to school. 
The District's reduction in the number of parking permits issued to Custodian 
Engineers and the change in the existing practice of distributing parking permits on 
request resulted in the inability of Custodian Engineers to park near the school buildings 
where they worked. Similar to County of Schenectady and Sheriff, in the present case, 
the District's unilateral action toward Custodian Engineers was premised upon direct 
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communications between the City and UFT, without any involvement from Local 891. 
The Skyler letter to Weingarten does not reference Local'891, which supports our 
conclusion that the changes brought about by the City's parking permit initiative were 
agreed upon by the City and the UFT to the exclusion of Local 891. Therefore, we 
affirm the ALJ's determination that the District unilaterally reduced the number of 
parking permits issued and changed the method of distributing parking permits to 
Custodian Engineers. 
The District challenges the ALJ's proposed order to restore its past practice of 
issuing parking permits to Custodian Engineers upon request as violating public policy. 
We find that this remedial order is appropriate and does not infringe on DOT's authority 
to regulate traffic and parking on City streets.6 The validity of District-issued parking 
permits for the on-street parking spaces remains subject to the powers and authority of 
DOTandNYPD.7 
6
 We take administrative notice of the decision by the New York County Supreme Court 
Justice Joan A. Madden in Council of School Supervisors and Administrators, Local 1, v 
New York City Dept of Educ, 2010 NY Slip Op 31664(U) (2010), decided on June.24, 
2010. In her decision, Justice Madden confirmed an arbitration award sustaining a 
contract grievance filed by Council of School Supervisors and Administrators (CSA) 
challenging the District's reduction in the number of parking permits that were given to 
CSA-represented employees as a result of the City's parking permit initiative. The 
District moved to vacate the award on the ground that it violated public policy because 
the award sought to override DOT's authority to control parking on City streets. In 
denying the District's motion to vacate the award, the Justice reasoned that the 
arbitrator decided the limited issue of the entitlement to parking permits within the 
District, an issue that had no bearing on DOT's authority to regulate parking on City 
streets. We also take notice that the District has filed a notice of appeal to the order 
and judgment. 
7
 New York. City Charter §2903 vests DOT with the authority to enforce laws, rules, and 
regulations concerning vehicle traffic and parking on New York City streets. 
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Finally, we reject the District's argument that the charge should have been 
dismissed because Local 891 failed to demand impact bargaining. The basis of the 
charge was the District's unilateral action regarding a mandatory subject of bargaining, 
not the impact of its action. Moreover, the ALJ did not find that the District refused to 
negotiate impact. 
Based upon our decision, we deny the exceptions and affirm the decision of the 
ALJ. ' . 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. restore to Local 891 unit employees the practice of granting a parking 
permit upon request; 
2. make Local 891 unit employees whole for any wages and benefits lost 
as a result of the unilateral termination of the past practice of granting 
parking permits to unit employees upon request, plus interest at the 
maximum legal rate; 
3. sign and post notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic 
locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: February 14, 2011 
Albany, New York-
/ / Jerome Lefkowitz, Chajnjian 
V 
-cyJ^ 
. / Sheila S. Cole, K/lember 
) 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Board of Education of the City School District of 
the City of New York in the bargaining unit represented by Local 891, International 
Union of Operating Engineers (Local 891) that the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York will: • ' 
1. restore to Local 891 unit employees the practice of granting a parking 
permit upon request; 
2. make Local 891 unit employees whole for any wages and benefits lost as 
a result of the unilateral termination of the past practice of granting parking 
permits to unit employees upon request, plus interest at the maximum 
legal rate. -
Dated By . 
on behalf of Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City of New York 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
